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“My Computer Is My Castle”: New Privacy
Frameworks to Regulate Police Hacking*
Ivan Škorvánek,† Bert-Jaap Koops,‡ Bryce Clayton Newell,**
and Andrew Roberts††
Several countries have recently introduced laws allowing the police to
hack into suspects’ computers. Legislators recognize that police hacking is
highly intrusive to personal privacy but consider it justified by the
increased use of encryption and mobile computing—both of which
challenge traditional investigative methods. Police hacking also
exemplifies a major challenge to the way legal systems deal with, and
conceptualize, privacy. Existing conceptualizations of privacy and privacy
rights do not always adequately address the types and degrees of intrusion
into individuals’ private lives that police hacking powers enable.
Traditional privacy pillars such as the home and secrecy of
communications do not always apply to computer-based police
investigations in an era of mobile technologies and ubiquitous data.
In this Article, we conduct a comparative legal analysis of criminal
procedure rules in the United States, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom to see which privacy frameworks lawmakers and
courts apply when regulating police hacking. We show that while classic
privacy frames of inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications
remain adequate for some forms of police hacking (observation and
interception), they fail to capture novel and fundamentally different ways
in which the most intrusive forms of police hacking (covert online searches
and remote surveillance) impact privacy in twenty-first-century society.

* The research for this Article was made possible by a grant from the Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), project number 453-14-004. We thank Leo
Nobile and Aldo Sghirinzetti for research assistance, and Nicolas von zur Mühlen for
valuable help. All translations in this Article are by the authors, except where otherwise
indicated.
† PhD Researcher, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT),
Tilburg University.
‡ Professor of Regulation and Technology, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology,
and Society (TILT), Tilburg University, the Netherlands.
** Assistant Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, University of
Oregon.
†† Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne.
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Our analysis shows the emergence of two new frameworks that have the
potential to begin filling this void: 1) a container-based approach, focusing
on the computer as protection-worthy in itself—or the “informatic home;”
and 2) a content-based approach, focusing on the protection of data—or
“informatic privacy.” Since both approaches have valuable benefits and
potential drawbacks, we propose that a complementary application of the
two might work best to capitalize on their advantages over traditional
privacy frameworks to regulate police hacking.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, lawmakers in several countries have introduced
police hacking powers into their domestic law. Relatedly, scholars
have noted that police use of malware is also becoming more
common. These trends have been driven, at least in part, by two
particular developments:
The first concerns the fact that many communications services
use end-to-end encryption, often by default, combined with the fact
that these providers often do not fall within the scope of traditional
wiretapping obligations1 (because they are over-the-top services
rather than communications channel providers). This implies that
traditional interception—which takes place somewhere along the
line—has become useless when it comes to capturing the contents
of communications.2 Relatedly, the increasing prevalence of harddisk encryption also contributes to these developments.3
Frequently, investigators have still been able to identify IP
addresses and other identifying information through, for example,
regular use of peer-to-peer software clients4 or software capable of
1. See Susan Hennessey, The Elephant in the Room: Addressing Child Exploitation and
Going Dark, HOOVER INST. (2017), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/
docs/hennessey_webreadypdf.pdf; Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds,
106 GEO. L.J. 989 (2018); Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 577, 578 n.28
(2018); Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get
What It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599
(2016); see also Paul Ohm, The Investigative Dynamics of the Use of Malware by Law Enforcement,
26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 303 (2017) (ascribing this position to the FBI as a primary
justification for using malware).
2. See, e.g., MIRJA GUTHEIL ET AL., LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HACKING BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT: IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF PRACTICES 8 (Policy Dep’t
for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs ed., 2017); Bundestag, Pro und Contra
Staats-trojaner bei der Anhörung zur Strafrechts-reform, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (June 1, 2017)
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2017/kw22-pa-recht-strafrecht/
508168 (Ger.); Ustawa o Policji uzasadnienie [Explanatory Memorandum to the Police Act],
KOMENDA GŁÓWNA POLICJI at 17-18, https://archiwumbip.mswia.gov.pl/download/4/
5283/Uzasadnienie.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (Pol.); Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372,
no. 3 at 7–10 (Neth.).
3. Felix Freiling, Christoph Safferling & Christian Rückert, Quellen-TKÜ und
Online-Durchsuchung als neue Maßnahmen für die Strafverfolgung: Rechtliche und
technische Herausforderungen, 2018 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCH. 9, 19 (2018) (Ger.) (referring to fulldisk encryption).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 641 F. App’x. 462, 464 (6th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Blouin, No. CR16-307 TSZ, 2017 WL
3485736, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2017) (“[Peer-to-peer scanning software] is not analogous
to . . . [a] NIT [because] [i]t does not place any program on the target computer or give the
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scanning torrent networks.5 However, when users move their illicit
activities to the so-called “dark web,” utilizing privacy-protecting
measures to avoid identification, successful investigation becomes
much more difficult without the use of police hacking techniques.
The second development is the increase in mobile computing—
notably, smartphones, laptops, and tablets—and cloud computing.
This implies that traditional search-and-seizure powers are
becoming less effective and less practical. Moreover, the rise of
wireless networking, enabling broad access to the internet from
many different access points, diminishes the usefulness of a
wiretap on a specific access point. Often, the police will be aware of
some logical address of a computer (e.g., an IP address) but not its
physical location. The difficulty in locating a computer to be
searched is compounded by anonymization techniques, such as
onion routing, which obfuscate the source of communications or
cyber-attacks. Police hacking is a useful way of countering this
trend, since it enables the police to search computers remotely
without having to know where they are physically located.6
Together, these developments are frequently captured by
statements that law enforcement is “going dark” or that they are
being confronted with an otherwise unsurmountable “encryption
problem.”7 As framed by former FBI Director James Comey,
“Going Dark” means that,
[t]hose charged with protecting our people aren’t always able to
access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent
terrorism even with lawful authority. We have the legal authority
to intercept and access communications and information
pursuant to court order, but we often lack the technical ability to
do so.8

Government access to anything other than the items in the ‘shared’ folder, which are
available to anyone using a similar peer-to-peer file-sharing program.”).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Hoeffener, No. 4:16CR00374 JAR/PLC, 2017 WL 3676141,
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2017).
6. See, e.g., id. at *19 (discussing challenges of anonymization); Kamerstukken II,
2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 10–13 (Neth.).
7. Lex Gill, Tamir Israel & Christopher Parsons, Shining a Light on the Encryption
Debate: A Canadian Field Guide 39, 51 (May 2018), https://christopher-parsons.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Shining-A-Light-Encryption-CitLab-CIPPIC.pdf.
8. James B. Comey, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision
Course?, FBI.GOV (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-aretechnology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course.
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Comey means here that, while the FBI may still technically
intercept data, these data are becoming meaningless (“dark”)
because of the rise of encryption, both of “data in motion”
(encrypted transmission) and of “data at rest” (encrypted storage).9
As a consequence, the argument goes, allowing the police to
covertly access computers remotely may well be the best way to
enable law enforcement to retain the capacity to collect evidence.
Remote covert access facilitates law enforcement in accessing data
before they are encrypted (or after they are decrypted) or retrieving
passwords used for the encryption, without resorting to cruder and
(even) more contestable measures such as compulsory backdoors
in communications services.10
Against this backdrop, a surprising number of countries have
introduced varying police hacking powers into their domestic law.
Legislators in these countries generally recognize the (potential)
intrusiveness of police hacking into individual lives and privacy
but have determined that the risks inherent in “going dark”
necessitated legislative action. Notably, police hacking powers vary
considerably by jurisdiction, and because of the varying
functionalities and scopes of hacking powers, there is considerable
confusion about the ways and degrees in which these new powers
(might) infringe fundamental rights. Police hacking is one of
several developments that challenge the way legal systems deal
with privacy: legal frameworks that use traditional notions of home
and communications content as key pillars of privacy protection do
not apply well to computer investigations in an era of mobile
technologies and ubiquitous data.11 Instead, new frameworks seem
to arise that may be better suited to contemporary digital
investigations, based on the notion that computers, rather than or

9. Id.
10. See Bert-Jaap Koops & Eleni Kosta, Looking for Some Light Through the Lens of
“Cryptowar” History: Policy Options for Law Enforcement Authorities Against “Going Dark,” 34
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 890 (2018) (“[L]egal hacking powers . . . could be the only
realistic policy option to preserve some light in an era of dark communication channels”).
11. See Bert-Jaap Koops, On Legal Boundaries, Technologies, and Collapsing Dimensions of
Privacy, 3 POLITICA E SOCIETÀ 247 (2014) (discussing how current privacy frameworks are
inadequate to regulate digital investigations); infra Section V.A; see also Bert-Jaap Koops,
Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A
Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2017) (for an overview of the current pillars of
privacy protection).
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besides homes, should be people’s bastion of privacy protection:
“my computer is my castle.”12
In this Article, we identify and compare how five countries
conceptualize the infringement of privacy in the context of police
hacking. We examine what these varying approaches can tell us
about the status and nature of privacy protections in the twentyfirst century. We conduct a comparative analysis of privacy
protection within the procedural criminal law of five countries in
which police hacking has been regulated and/or in which there has
been interesting discussion about the issue: Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These
jurisdictions were chosen based on their centrality to a larger,
ongoing research project on protecting privacy in the twenty-first
century and include a mix of common law and civil law
jurisdictions. The broader methodological considerations driving
this country selection have been outlined elsewhere.13 We analyze
statutory and case law at the federal level in these countries to
highlight the primary safeguards in the law; lower-level
regulations and guidelines are beyond the scope of this Article. As
we are interested in the rationale for imposing certain safeguards,
we also analyze legislative histories and policy debates to
determine which privacy frameworks have guided lawmakers to
12. See also infra Section V.B; cf. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Ivan
Škorvánek, Location Tracking by Police: The Regulation of “Tireless and Absolute Surveillance,” 9
U.C.I. L. REV. 635 (2019) (discussing new privacy paradigms emerging in the context of police
location tracking); Michael D. Ricciuti & Kathleen D. Parker, My Phone Is My Castle: Supreme
Court Decides that Cell Phones Seized Incident to Arrest Cannot Be Subject to Routine Warrantless
Searches, 58 BOS. B.J. 7 (2014) (discussing cell phones as new object of privacy protection in
the context of searches incident to arrest).
13. See Koops et al., supra note 11, at 504–506. In this Article, we exclude the
jurisdictions addressed in the larger project that lack regulation or substantial doctrinal
literature on police hacking (Canada, Czech Republic, and Poland). In Canada, police
hacking powers (often referred to as “lawful access” provisions) have “languished on the
Canadian agenda” due to a series of unfavorable “federal elections and successful civil
liberties opposition to the legislation, along with businesses’ resistance[.]” Christopher
Parsons, Stuck on the Agenda: Drawing Lessons from the Stagnation of “Lawful Access” Legislation
in Canada, in LAW, PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 261
(Michael A. Geist ed., University of Ottawa Press 2015). In Poland, police hacking is not
regulated in criminal procedure law, although a provision allowing covert access to data has
been recently included in Art. 19(6) of the Police Act. Ustawa o Policji Art. 19(6) (1990 r. DZ.
U. Nr 30, poz. 179) (Pol.). Nevertheless, the issue has not been taken up extensively in the
domestic literature. In the Czech Republic, explicit regulation of police hacking does not
exist, and we could not unearth any relevant sources showing that it is taking place under
more general surveillance provisions, despite hints of it being so.
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impose (or not impose) certain safeguards. Our Article is limited to
hacking by law enforcement authorities; we leave aside hacking by
intelligence agencies.
The Article is structured as follows. In Part II, we explain what
police hacking entails, in terms of the terminology involved, the
ways in which police can hack into computers, and the goals or
functionalities of such hacking. Part III gives a bird’s-eye overview
of police hacking regulations in our five jurisdictions. We then
analyze the regulation of police hacking in more detail in Part IV,
discussing which safeguards apply to the different functionalities
of police hacking. Part V focuses on the privacy paradigms that
underlie these safeguards; we highlight to what extent lawmakers
resort to classic privacy frames (such as protection of homes and
communications content) to guide their stipulation of safeguards,
and which new privacy frames are emerging in the regulation of
police hacking. The Conclusion summarizes the main findings and
provides an outlook on the traditional and new privacy frames
used to regulate police hacking.
I. BACKGROUND: POLICE HACKING
A. Terminology
Before examining how and where police hacking takes place,
we need to explain the terminology used. Lawmakers and authors
use an amazing variety of terms to refer to activities by law
enforcement agencies that enable them to covertly access
computers.14 A simple umbrella term is “police hacking”15—or,
more generally (although it also includes hacking by security and
intelligence agencies), “government hacking.”16 Similarly, some
14. MARCO TORRE, IL CAPTATORE INFORMATICO. NUOVE TECNOLOGIE INVESTIGATIVE E
12–13 (Milano, Giuffrè Editore 2017) (“[H]igh-court
case-law uses terms such as ‘computer sensor’ and ‘intruding agent;’ doctrine prefers ‘online
searches,’ ‘covert remote acquisition,’ spyware, atypical captures, Trojan horses and State
viruses . . . In this contribution it seems preferable to use the expression ‘remote control
systems’ (RCS).”) (internal references omitted); Mayer, supra note 1, at 575 n.16
(“Government documents have referred to hacking with a wide variety of terms, including
Network Investigative Technique (NIT), Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier
(CIPAV), Internet Protocol Address Verifier (IPAV), Remote Access Search and Surveillance
(RASS), Remote Computer Search, Remote Search, Web Bug, Sniffer, Computer Tracer,
Internet Tracer, and Remote Computer Trace.”).
15. GUTHEIL ET AL., supra note 2.
16. Mayer, supra note 1 (using the term “government hacking”).
RISPETTO DELLE REGOLE PROCESSUALI
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authors talk of “lawful hacking,” to distinguish the practice from
criminal hacking.17 To avoid negative associations that the term
“hacking” may trigger, however, governments tend to avoid the
term altogether and instead try to use some suitably vague or
technical-sounding term. In U.S. courts, the use of the term
“malware” to describe authorized government hacking activities
has also occasionally proven controversial, with at least one federal
district court noting that the term, as defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary,18 was not necessarily appropriate “[d]ue to the negative
connotations associated with the word.”19 Additionally, U.K. law
speaks of “Computer Network Exploitation” or “Equipment
Interference,”20 while in the United States, the term “Network
Investigative Techniques” (NITs) is frequently used.21 The
Dutch lawmaker has used the overly broad term “investigation in
a computer” (onderzoek in een geautomatiseerd werk) as a label for
police hacking.22
Rather than using an umbrella term, however, we can also refer
to police hacking based on the particular target or aims behind the
activity. Thus, when police hacking aims to copy stored data, it
might be called an “online search” (in Germany: online-

17. Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark & Susan Landau, Lawful Hacking:
Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1
(2014).
18. Black’s Law Dictionary considers “malware” slang, and forwards readers to
“malicious technology,” which is defined as “[a]ny electronic or mechanical means, esp.
software, used to monitor or gain access to another’s computer system without authorization
for the purpose of impairing or disabling the system. Examples of malicious technology are
Trojan horses, time-outs, keystroke logging, and data-scrambling devices.” Malicious
Technology, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
19. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, at 601–02 (E.D. Va. 2016). But see
United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 208 (3rd Cir. 2018) (“The FBI’s solution was the NIT,
a form of government-created malware that allowed the FBI to retrieve identifying
information from Playpen users located all around the world.”); United States v. Workman,
863 F.3d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[I]n this case, the FBI seized and assumed control, using
malware to identify and find the individuals accessing child pornography”).
20. See U.K. HOME OFFICE, EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE: CODE OF PRACTICE (March
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/715479/Equipment_Interference_Code_of_Practice.pdf [hereinafter
Code of Practice].
21. Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hacking to Light the Dark Web: What
Risks to International Relations and International Law?, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 59 (2017).
22. Artikel 126nba SV (Neth.).
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Durchsuchung23; in Italy: perquisizione online24), and when it is
targeted at intercepting communications, it might be called “source
telecommunications surveillance” (in Germany, QuellenTelekommunikations Überwachung25) or simply “interception” as in
the United States.26 Frequently, police hacking is also referred to in
terms of the primary tool used: malware or “policeware,”27 “State
viruses,”28 “State Trojans” or “federal Trojans,”29 or “intruder
agents.”30 In Italy, the most commonly used term to indicate police
hacking is “computer sensor” (captatore informatico).31
Where the hacking is limited to specific functionalities, such as
the remote and covert search of a hard disk, more specific terms
such as “online search” can be used. Such usage requires care,
however: a “search” in criminal law typically refers to a one-off
activity focused on accessing existing (stored) data; in contrast, an
“online search,” for instance in the German context, encompasses
not merely a one-off search of existing data but also real-time
collection of data generated during the period of execution, making
the term “online search” rather misleading.32 Similarly, using
“policeware” or “State Trojans” can be too narrow if, beyond
purely remote searches, the investigatory conduct can also take the
form of physically installing a keylogger on a computer or logging
in to someone’s account with a phished or intercepted password.
In this Article, we use the term “police hacking,” for purposes
of convenience, as an umbrella term that encompasses the broad
23. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 18.
24. Federica Iovene, Le c.d. perquisizioni online tra nuovi diritti fondamentali ed esigenze
di accertamento penale, 4 DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, nos. 3–4, 2014, at 331.
25. Stephan Beukelmann, Online-Durchsuchung und Quellen-TKÜ, 13 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT SPEZIAL 440, 440 (2017) (Ger.).
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)–(4) (2012) (referring to “interception” and defining
“intercept” in the context of accessing electronic and oral communications).
27. Bart Jacobs, Policeware, 39 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 2761 (2012).
28. Cass. Pen., sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100, CED Cass. 2015 (“Musumeci”) (It.).
29. Dennis-Kenji Kipker, Vom Staatstrojaner zum staatseigenen Bundestrojaner, 49
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 88, 88 (2016). A “Trojan” is a piece of malware (malicious
software) that sneakily nestles itself on a computer, invisibly for the user, and opens a
backdoor that enables someone with knowledge of this backdoor to covertly access the
computer and remotely take control of it. See, e.g., What Is a Trojan? Is It a Virus or Is It
Malware?, NORTON (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) https://us.norton.com/internetsecuritymalware-what-is-a-trojan.html (explaining how “Trojans” work).
30. Cass. Pen., sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100 (“Musumeci”).
31. C.p.p. Art. 266(2) (Ita.); TORRE, supra note 14.
32. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 13.
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array of possible police powers and methods that police might use
to covertly access computers for purposes of criminal investigation.
In contrast to euphemisms that serve as a rhetorical tool to
downplay or obfuscate the intrusiveness of the measure, such as
“Network Investigative Techniques” or “investigation in a
computer,” the term “hacking” clearly pinpoints the core of this
investigation measure: non-consensual access to a computer. This
umbrella term has the benefit of encompassing all forms of access—
both physical and remote—and all kinds of tools or modes
of access.
B. Modes of Hacking
Police hacking can be done in different ways.33 The main tool
for police hacking is malware, which can be installed on (or
delivered to) a target computer in three ways. The first and most
direct form is to install malware when the police have physical
access to a computer, for instance, by covertly entering a dwelling
to install a keylogger onto a computer34 or uploading the software
at a border check.35 Social engineering might sometimes work to
trick the targeted user into, for example, inserting an infected USB
stick into their computer.36
Because physical access is often not possible, the second basic
form is more common: remotely infecting the computer with
malware. This happens largely in the same way as cybercriminals
deploy malware, namely, to send a message to a target computer
user and use social engineering to trick the user into opening an
attachment or clicking on a link, which will then covertly install
the malware.37
33. See, e.g., Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶¶ 3.2–3.3 (discussing various modes of
police hacking).
34. TORRE, supra note 14, at 16.
35. Tanja Niedernhuber, Die StPO-Reform 2017 – wichtige Änderungen im Überblick, 50
JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLÄTTER 169, 171 (2018).
36. Giuseppe Vaciago & David Silva Ramalho, Online Searches and Online Surveillance:
The Use of Trojans and Other Types of Malware as Means of Obtaining Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings, 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 88, 89 (2016).
37. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S
IMPERSONATION OF A JOURNALIST IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2016),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1607.pdf; JÜRGEN-PETER GRAF, STPO § 100B ONLINEDURCHSUCHUNG BECKOK STPO MIT RISTBV UND MISTRA Rn. 27 (Graf ed., 31 ed. 2018);
TORRE, supra note 14, at 15; Mayer, supra note 1, at 574–76, 583–84.
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As with criminal malware, the infection of someone’s computer
with policeware is an extremely far-reaching measure. It basically
enables police to take remote control without the computer user’s
knowledge, allowing copying, transmitting, altering, or removing
data, turning on the webcam and microphone, etc. Hackers speak
of this level of user rights in terms of “I own you,” and the idea of
law enforcement agencies “owning” someone might well be seen
as “deeply disturbing.”38
A third and less intrusive form of police hacking is covertly
accessing a computer using the user’s username and password.
These credentials might be obtained through phishing and other
forms of social engineering, by using software to guess
passwords,39 or they may perhaps have been found during a
regular search or through interception. Hacking into a computer or
cloud service using lawfully obtained credentials also allows
searching all the user’s data, but it does not enable remote control
to the extent that malware infections do.
C. Functionalities of Hacking
Police hacking and policeware can serve many purposes. These
techniques have been called a “Swiss army knife”40 and a “bulimic
device,”41 emphasizing the multi-purpose nature of police hacking.
These metaphors carry the connotations of a likely tendency of the
tool to include ever more purposes (with so many nifty gadgets that
the original function—cutting—is lost from sight), thriving on an
insatiable hunger for ever more data. As Parts III and IV will show,
most jurisdictions allow some functionalities of police hacking but
not others, or they apply different conditions to the various
functionalities. It is therefore important to distinguish the precise
functionalities that laws on police hacking—in general or in specific
cases—allow.
38. Jacobs, supra note 27, at 2762.
39. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 34 (Neth.).
40. BERT-JAAP KOOPS, CHARLOTTE CONINGS & FRANK VERBRUGGEN, ZOEKEN IN
COMPUTERS NAAR NEDERLANDS EN BELGISCH RECHT 61 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2016).
41. Luigi Palmieri, La nuova disciplina del captatore informatico tra esigenze investigative e
salvaguardia dei diritti fondamentali. Dalla sentenza “Scurato” alla riforma sulle intercettazioni, 8
DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, no. 1, 2018 at 59, 60 (quoting Leonardo Filippi, L’ispeperqui-intercettazione “itinerante”: le Sezioni unite azzeccano la diagnosi ma sbagliano la terapia, IL
PENALISTA (Sept. 6, 2016), http://ilpenalista.it/articoli/news/lispe-perqui-intercettazioneitinerante-le-sezioni-unite-azzeccano-la-diagnosi-ma).
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We make Dutch law our starting point for providing an
overview of possible functionalities, since it has the most
extensive list.42 Police hacking can, in principle, be used for the
following purposes:
A. Capturing specific types of data. This is the
least intrusive form, focusing only on acquiring
certain data needed for the investigation. Dutch
law gives as examples of this functionality the
capture of identifying information (to establish
who uses the computer) or the location of the
computer (and thereby, the user). It might be
seen as a digital sneak-and-peek operation.43
B. Remote search of stored data. This involves the
remote and covert search of existing data, stored
on the infected target computer or stored on a
service provider’s server (possibly in the cloud).
The search may be targeted at certain data or
may involve making a mirror image of the hard
disk. This is functionally equivalent to a
traditional search of a place, such as a dwelling,
and the seizure or mirror-imaging of computers
found during the search, but a crucial difference
is that the hacking-based remote search is covert:
it remains unknown to the persons affected by
the search. It shares, however, the characteristics
of the traditional search in being a one-off search
of existing data, which distinguishes it from the
following functionality: remote monitoring.44
C. Remote monitoring of computer use. This is
one of the most comprehensive functionalities,
enabling the capture of data that come into
42. See infra Section III.C. In addition to these, TORRE, supra note 14, at 18, also
mentions “circumventing commercial anti-virus software” as a functionality of police
hacking, but we consider this a system requirement of policeware rather than a purpose in
itself.
43. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 20 (Neth.).
44. Dutch law treats the functionalities of a remote search (B) and remote monitoring
(C) together as a single purpose, but we distinguish them as two separate functions to
emphasize the important dogmatic difference between searching existing data (one-off and
backward-looking) and monitoring computer use (periodic and forward-looking). Artikel
126nba(1)(d) SV (Neth.).
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existence after the malware infection during a
certain period. It can take the form of a repeated
remote search at certain intervals (e.g., at the end
of each day searching for newly stored data) or
real-time monitoring (e.g., using the keylogger
function to transmit in real-time what the user
types or clicks). This can be combined with
taking screenshots or screencasting. Thus, this
functionality has a hybrid character. On the one
hand, it can resemble a (repeated) search,
focusing on acquiring stored data, with the
atypical element that it is not only targeted at
historic data but also at data that will come into
existence after the order for hacking has been
given. On the other hand, it can resemble realtime surveillance, virtually an equivalent of an
invisible police officer looking over a person’s
shoulder at whatever they do with their
computer.
D. Intercepting communications. With this
functionality, policeware is used as an
alternative means of (or as a way to implement)
intercepting
communications.
As
with
traditional interception, there are two different
modalities.
1. Intercepting electronic communications,
such as email, texting, chatting, Skyping,
or FaceTiming. Since most of these
services nowadays use end-to-end
encryption, and interception through the
service provider is often not possible,45

45. Full-throated end-to-end encryption makes it impossible for the service provider
to access (or grant access to) the plaintext of encrypted communications. Voice-over-InternetProtocol (VoIP) providers are subject to lawful access provisions such as those of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in the United States. See
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services,
71 Fed. Reg. 38091-01 (July 5, 2006) (FCC final rule establishing guidelines for VoIP services’
compliance with CALEA); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and
Broadband Access and Services, 20 FCC. Rcd. 14989 (Sept. 23, 2005) (FCC order classifying
VoIP services as subject to CALEA’s requirements). However, such obligations do not apply
to other types of online communications tools (e.g., messaging or chat apps) that are equally
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interception at the source before
encryption (or at the destination after
decryption) may be the only way to
capture the contents of online
communications.
2. Intercepting oral communications. This
can be done by, e.g., using the malware
to turn on the computer’s microphone,
which enables recording the sounds and
conversations taking place with, or in the
vicinity of, the device. Here, hacking
functions as a means to implement oral
interception, similar to placing a bug in a
computer or other object in use by the
suspect.
E. Visual observation. This functionality is served
by turning on the computer’s webcam, which
can be used to identify the user or the
computer’s location, or to observe the behavior
of the user or people in its environment. Here,
police hacking is a functional equivalent to
installing
a
hidden
camera
in
the
suspect’s environment.
F. Remotely deleting (unlawful) data. This
functionality—only encountered in Dutch law—
enables the police to remotely remove or delete
unlawful data, such as child pornography or
botnet infection software, from a targeted
computer. It complements the functionality of a
remote search, so that, similarly to situations of
a traditional search,46 police can remove
unlawful data they find on a hard disk (or in an
account) from the suspect’s control. It also might

or even more popular than voice communications. Besides scope issues, there are also
jurisdictional problems when providers do not fall under national (CALEA-resembling)
legislation; see, e.g., Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 9 (Neth.).
46. Cf. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, art. 19(3)(d), Nov. 23, 2001, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 108–11, E.T.S. No. 185 (requiring Parties to adopt measures to seize or
similarly secure computer data, including the power to “render inaccessible or remove those
computer data in the accessed computer system”).
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enable the police to remotely disinfect
computers that have fallen victim to a botnet,
although such interference with the computers
of non-suspects would be highly controversial.
As is clear from this list, police hacking is quite varied in nature.
Nevertheless, it is possible to classify the different purposes into
two main categories: (1) search and (2) surveillance.47 This
grouping matches a classic distinction in criminal investigation
powers, namely between investigations that are generally overt
and backward-looking (i.e., looking for existing evidence)—as in
search and seizure powers—and investigations that are generally
covert and forward-looking (i.e., looking for evidence yet to come
into existence)—through the special investigation powers of
surveillance. Functionalities A, B and F (and perhaps part of C), can
be classified in the category of search, while the functionalities of
C, D and E fall within the category of surveillance.
II. BROAD OVERVIEW OF LAWS ON POLICE HACKING
Since the different functionalities of police hacking are usually
covered by the same (or a small number of) provisions in the
procedural criminal law in each of the countries we studied, we first
give a high-level overview of the most relevant provisions for each
country. This overview introduces the main provisions regulating
police hacking powers, the functionalities allowed, and the main
safeguards placed on the exercise of this power, including the
authorization requirements, types of offenses for which police
hacking is allowed, necessity requirements, temporal limitations,
and other safeguards, where relevant.
A. Germany
In Germany, police hacking has until recently only been
regulated in various federal and state-level police laws in the
context of preventive police activities. Only recently has the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, hereafter: German
CCP) been amended to provide a legal basis for police hacking for

47. TORRE, supra note 14, at 18–19 (citing Roberto Flor, Brevi riflessioni a margine della
sentenza del Bundesverfassungsgericht sulla c.d. Online Durchsuchung, 22 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PEN. EC.
695, 697 et seq. (2009)).
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criminal investigation in Sections 100a and 100b of the German
CCP. The way in which the amendment came about has been
criticized in literature48 as well as by the experts invited to the
parliamentary expert hearing.49 The amendment was inserted into
the draft of the Criminal Procedure reform rather late in the
legislative process and the bill was adopted only five weeks later.
This meant that a proper parliamentary and societal debate about
the proposed, and highly intrusive, investigation measures could
not be conducted.50
German regulation of police hacking is split into two
provisions. Section 100a regulates the so-called source interception
of telecommunications (Quellen-TKŰ) and Section 100b regulates
the so-called online search (Online-Durchsuchung), which is subject
to considerably stricter procedural safeguards. The origin of the
split can be traced back to the landmark decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court from February 27, 2008,51 which interpreted
the German Basic Law as protecting the right to integrity and
confidentiality of computer systems. This new right especially
protects citizens from covert interventions into their computers and
can only be restricted in extremely selective circumstances.
However, as an exception, if such covert intervention is restricted
to obtaining the content or metadata of ongoing communications,
the protection of integrity and confidentiality of computer systems
does not apply and the less-weighty requirements of constitutional
protection of communications must be observed. This distinction
allowed the legislature to regulate source interception of
communications as a special form of police hacking, essentially an
extension of the existing telecommunications interception powers.
Thus, Section 100a of the German CCP (regulating the
monitoring and recording of telecommunications) was
supplemented to provide a legal basis for the source interception
of telecommunications:

48. Beukelmann, supra note 25, at 440; Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 9–10; Tobias
Singelnstein & Benjamin Derin, Singelnstein/Derin: Das Gesetz zur effektiveren und
praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des Strafverfahrens, 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHR. 2646,
2646 (2017).
49. Bundestag, supra note 2.
50. Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2646.
51. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008 (Ger.).
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The monitoring and recording of telecommunications may also be
carried out by intervening with technical means in information
technology systems used by the data subject, if this is necessary,
to enable monitoring and recording, in particular in unencrypted
form. Content and circumstances of the communication stored on
the information technology system of the person concerned may
be monitored and recorded, if they could have been monitored
and recorded in encrypted form in the public telecommunication
network during the current transmission process.52

Section 100a, therefore, allows two functionalities of police
hacking: 1) monitoring and recording ongoing telecommunications
and 2) obtaining stored data if the data relate to past
telecommunications that could have been monitored under the
existing judicial order. The latter functionality seems to go beyond
the limitation to ongoing telecommunications imposed by the
Federal Constitutional Court and should arguably find its legal
basis in Section 100b.
While Section 100a merely extends the existing powers of
interception of communications, Section 100b enters completely
new territory, differing not so much in the means by which
interception is conducted, but by the extent of the data which can
be collected.53 Section 100b reads:
Even without the knowledge of the person concerned, technical
means may be used to intervene in an information technology
system used by the data subject and data may be collected
therefrom (online search) . . . .

This provision gives law enforcement a potentially very wide
access to data in information systems, including not only past data,
but also future data that become available in the duration of a police
hacking measure. Unlike the measure under Section 100a, past data
available to the investigators also include data originating from
before the ordering of the measure. However, according to the
prevalent opinion in doctrinal literature, the measure does not
permit independent generation of data by the investigators or
making changes to the data. Therefore, police are not allowed, for

52. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 100a(1) (Ger.).
53. Fredrik Roggan, Die strafprozessuale Quellen-TKÜ und Online-Durchsuchung:
Elektronische Überwachungsmaßnahmen mit Risiken für Beschuldigte und die Allgemeinheit, 12
STV - STRAFVERTEIDIGER 821, 825 (2017).
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instance, to secretly turn on the camera or the microphone, or to
delete unlawful data from the information system.54
Authorization requirements for both measures are regulated in
Section 100e of the German CCP. Source interception of
telecommunications under Section 100a must be ordered by a court
upon request of the public prosecutor. The measure may be
ordered by the public prosecutor in case of imminent danger (of
losing evidence), provided a court confirms the claim of imminent
danger within three working days. The order is valid for three
months, which can be extended as long as the conditions of the
order persist.
The so-called online search under Section 100b may only be
ordered by the chamber of a Landgericht (mid-level district court).
In case of imminent danger, the chamber’s chairman may order the
measure, but the chamber must confirm it within three working
days. This order is limited to a maximum of one month, although it
can be extended; any extension beyond a total of six months must
be decided by the Higher Regional Court.
Both measures are restricted to a particular set of criminal
offenses, where the act is especially serious in the individual case
and hacking is considered necessary. Source telecommunications
interception can be ordered if there are particular grounds to
suspect a perpetrator has committed a serious crime or, where
punishable, attempted or prepared to commit such an act. The same
standard of suspicion is required for ordering an online search, but
this is further restricted to particularly serious crimes, which
nevertheless comprise a rather extensive list of not only violent
offenses but also particularly serious economic crimes. Police
hacking thus becomes a tool available for a significantly broader set
of activities than under various other police laws, where it is limited
to counter-terrorism activities.55 Both measures may only be
ordered if the determination of the facts or the whereabouts of the
perpetrator could not otherwise be obtained, and may only target
the suspect or persons who communicate with the accused or use
the same devices.
54. Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2467; see also Niedernhuber, supra note 35,
at 172.
55. See, for example, § 49 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz (Ger.), which permits police
hacking in order to protect the body, life and freedom of persons, or such public goods on
which the foundations of the state or human existence depend.
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A further limitation, particular to the German legal system, are
the requirements for the protection of the core area of private life
(Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung), which guarantees a highly
private sphere that is free from surveillance in order to protect
human dignity. This sphere consists of inner processes, such as
impressions and feelings, as well as reflections, views, and
experiences of a highly personal nature.56 The core area is relevant
both during data collection (avoiding intrusion as much as
possible) and during data analysis and use (minimizing the
intrusion by excluding all accidentally collected data that fall into
the core area).57 As data relevant to the core area cannot
be adequately excluded during data collection, safeguards must
be put in place at the levels of analysis and use, such as using
an independent examiner to screen the information and filter
out information relevant to the core area prior to making
the
information
available
to
the
investigating
law
enforcement authority.58
B. Italy
Police hacking is generally discussed under the moniker of
“informatic sensors” (captatori informatici). Sometimes these
“sensors” are referred to as “state viruses” (virus di Stato), inspired
by the German Bundestrojaner. The use of hacking for remote
searches is usually referred to as an “online search” (perquisizione
online). Although the technique appears to be massively used in
practice, it is largely unregulated and there are relatively few court
cases on its lawfulness as an investigation power or on the use of
resulting evidence.59 Only one proposal, regulating the
functionality of oral interception, has so far been successful in the
legislature, despite a number of efforts to regulate covert online
investigations.60 The under-regulation of police hacking is severely
criticized in doctrinal literature, given that it is used in practice
56. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016,
1 BvR 966/09, Rn. 120–21 (Ger.).
57. Id. at Rn. 216–17.
58. Id. at Rn. 220.
59. Vaciago & Ramalho, supra note 36, at 91.
60. See the overviews in id. at 92–93 and Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889, Arch.
nuova proc. pen. 2017, 76, § 2 (“Scurato”) (It.). The situation with respect to covert online
investigations has not changed since 2016.
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but without specific safeguards associated with constitutional
privacy protection.61
Nevertheless, Italian courts have been rather permissive in
allowing various applications of police hacking under existing legal
provisions. Covertly installing a device on a computer to acquire
files stored on it was held by the Italian Supreme Court to be
governed by article 189 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure
(Italian CCP) (atypical means of searching for evidence), for which
a motivated order from the Public Prosecutor suffices.62 In contrast,
in the 2012 Ryanair case, the Italian Supreme Court ruled out using
a Trojan to monitor data flows to and from a computer on the basis
of traditional search and seizure powers.63 In the realm of electronic
communications interception, the Italian Supreme Court in
Occhionero found that there was no general principle disallowing
the use of Trojans under interception provisions.64
The use of Trojans for intercepting communications,
particularly oral interception through turning on the computer’s
microphone, has triggered more case law. In Bisignani, the
investigatory judge authorized this practice on the basis of article
266(2) of the Italian CCP (interception of oral communications).65 In
Musumeci, the Italian Supreme Court found that installing spyware
(programma spia) on a portable device that turned on the
microphone was a form of oral interception and that this can only
take place “in clearly circumscribed places, identified at the outset,
and not wherever the subject might be.”66 However, this
judgment was overturned in 2016 by the United Sections of the
Italian Supreme Court in Scurato,67 which held that such use of

61. See Iovene, supra note 24, at 341; Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60, 65–66.
62. Cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556, CED Cassazione (“Virruso”) (It.), confirmed
in Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, n. 254865 (“Bisignani”) (It.); see also Vaciagio & Ramalho,
supra note 36, at 92.
63. TORRE, supra note 14, at 48.
64. Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (“Occhionero”) (It.). See also Carola Frediani,
Trojan per intercettazioni nelle indagini, via libera dalla Cassazione, LA STAMPA (Oct. 25, 2017),
http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/25/italia/trojan-per-intercettazioni-nelle-indagini-vialibera-dalla-cassazione-R0jMpFvJJZAq33P4a9oZII/pagina.html.
64. Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (“Occhionero”) (It.).
65. Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, n. 254865 (“Bisignani”) (It.).
66. Cass., sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100 (“Musumeci”) (It.).
67. Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889 (“Scurato”) (It.).
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a Trojan is effectively never permissible except in
organized-crime investigations.68
In statutory law, only the use of Trojans for oral interception
targeting mobile devices has been specifically regulated. In 2017, a
law was passed to amend article 266(2) of the Italian CCP so that
oral interception (in Italian terms: interception of communications
“between people present”) can also be conducted by inserting an
informatic sensor on a mobile electronic device.69 An investigative
judge must authorize the measure upon a prosecutor’s request. The
decree authorizing the hacking must articulate why this measure is
necessary, as well as—if the crime is not one of the statutorily
enumerated serious crimes—”the places and the time, also
indirectly determined, in relation to which the activation of the
microphone is permitted.”70
C. The Netherlands
Until recently, the police power to access computers remotely
and covertly was very limited in the Netherlands.71 Police could
covertly access computers in two specific situations,72 but only to
intercept communications, not to search the (data stored on a)
computer. In June 2018, however, a law was passed to enable legal
hacking. The Computer Crime III Act (Wet computercriminaliteit III),
which entered into force on March 1, 2019, introduced legal hacking
as a special investigatory power in the Dutch Code of Criminal
Procedure (Dutch CCP).73
The provisions introduced by the Computer Crime III Act
involve a far-reaching and broad set of powers combined within
one single provision. The basic idea is that computers can be
covertly accessed remotely, in order to perform a variety of follow68. Id. at §§ 6–7. For a more detailed discussion of the Italian case law, see infra Part IV.
69. Decreto Legge 29 dicembre 2017, n.216, G.U. Nov. 1, 2018, n.8 (It.). Note that the
law’s entry into effect has been postponed to March 2019.
70. C.p.p. Art. 267(1) (It.).
71. Bert-Jaap Koops & Jan-Jaap Oerlemans, Formeel strafrecht en ICT, in STRAFRECHT EN
ICT 117, 175 (Bert-Jaap Koops & Jan-Jaap Oerlemans eds., 2019).
72. One situation is entering a dwelling to place a bug for oral interception; the other
is accessing a computer as a technical means to execute an order for intercepting
telecommunications. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Dutch Law 17,
38 (TILT L. & Tech. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2837483.
73. See Stb. 2018, 322 (Neth.) (Act); Stb. 2019, 67 (Neth.) (entry into force).

1018

003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

997

7/17/20 12:39 PM

“My Computer Is My Castle”

up investigatory activities. These follow-up activities (which thus
indicate the purposes for which remote covert access is allowed)
are exhaustively mentioned in article 126nba(1) of the Dutch CCP:
A. Determining certain characteristics (especially
the identity or location) of the computer or the
user.
B. Recording confidential communications (both
telecommunications and oral interception).
C. Systematically observing where the remote
access facilitates observation.74
D. Securing data (both data stored on the computer
and data that enter the computer after the
remote access) for the period authorized in the
order.
E. Rendering data inaccessible, for example to
delete unlawful data from the user’s computer
(usually after copying the data for evidential
purposes).
This power can be applied for a period of four weeks, which can
be prolonged repeatedly, each time for an additional four weeks.
This requires authorization from an investigatory judge and from
the Council of Procurators-General after advice from a technicallegal advisory body (Central Examination Committee).75 The
power can be used for investigating serious crimes: remote access
for the goals mentioned under A, B, and C is possible for pre-trial
detention crimes (generally, crimes carrying a maximum of at least
four years’ imprisonment) that seriously breach the rule of law;
access for the goals mentioned under D and E is only possible for
crimes carrying a maximum penalty of at least eight years’
imprisonment and for specially designated felonies.76
Only computers “in use with the suspect”77 can be investigated
remotely. Depending on the circumstances, this might include the
laptop or smartphone of the suspect’s co-inhabitants, friends, or
74. Art. 126g, SV (Neth.).
75. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 37.
76. This particularly involves felonies where “there is often no other clue” than to use
the present power, such as botnet infections, child pornography, grooming, and other
computer-related crimes. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 29.
77. Art. 126nba(1), SV (Neth.).
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relatives, if the suspect (more or less regularly, e.g., more than just
once or twice) uses these devices.
Various safeguards are in place to regulate this method of legal
hacking. For example, the order should specify the way the power
is to be used and, for prolongation of use, the investigatory judge
must give renewed authorization. The software used for remotely
infecting computers should also conform to certain technical
requirements.78 Furthermore, the power is to be executed by
specifically designated technical investigation officers, while the
collected data will be analyzed by officers investigating the case;
this functional separation between technical and tactical
investigation officers79 is an important safeguard because it
prevents the primary investigating officers from having unlimited
technical access to all the collected data. Afterwards, the software
used should, in principle, be removed from the user’s computer
unless that is too difficult or risky; in the latter case, the infected
computer’s administrator should be notified so that they can (try
to) remove the software on their own.80 Also, relevant
subjects (betrokkenen) should be notified, unless this jeopardizes
the investigation.81
D. United Kingdom
The framework that regulates interference with computers and
other electronic devices (“equipment interference”) in the United
Kingdom is found in a set of relatively complex provisions that
together comprise Part 5 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016
(IPA). This part of the Act is supplemented by a statutory Code of
Practice (Code).82 The Code is intended to be read in conjunction
with the primary legislation and provides guidance to public
authorities responsible for authorizing interference.83 Unlike any
78. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 31.
79. Id.
80. Art. 126nba(6), SV (Neth.).
81. Art. 126bb, SV (Neth.).
82. Code of Practice, supra note 21. Section 241 and Schedule 7 of the Investigatory
Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 272, sch. 10 (Eng.) require the Secretary of State to issue codes of
practice about the exercise of powers and functions conferred by the Act.
83. Such codes have become an increasingly common means of regulating
investigatory powers in the United Kingdom. They have an unusual legal status. The
requirement to issue them is usually set out in the primary legislation that confers the
investigatory powers to which they relate, but the codes themselves do not constitute
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internal guidance that might be published by public bodies
exercising powers to interfere with equipment, the Code is a
significant legal instrument extending to some 140 pages.
The Code’s preamble states that its provisions are admissible as
evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings, and that any court or
tribunal considering such proceedings “may take the provision of
the codes of practice into account.”84 Courts have taken breaches of
codes of practice regulating more traditional investigatory powers
into account in determining the admissibility of evidence.85 If, as
appears to be the case, the Code relating to equipment
interference enjoys a similar status, breaches of its provisions might
also affect the admissibility of evidence acquired through
equipment interference.
The powers conferred by the IPA are very broad. In contrast to
traditional warrants for the search of physical premises, which are
judicially issued, equipment interference warrants are issued by the
chief officer of a police area. Judicial oversight is maintained,
however, by the requirement—except in urgent cases—that a chief
police officer’s decision to issue a warrant be approved by a Judicial
Commissioner.86 A warrant will either authorize or require the
persons to whom it is addressed to secure interference with any
“equipment” for the purpose of obtaining communications,
equipment data, or any other information. “Equipment” is defined
in very broad terms, as “any equipment producing
electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emissions, or any device capable
of being used in connection with such equipment.”87 Any device
with components powered by an electrical charge will generate
electromagnetic emissions. The Code provides as examples
“desktop computers, laptops, tablets, smartphones, other internet-

primary legislation. Nevertheless, codes for traditional investigatory powers have been the
subject of the kind of interpretive inquiry usually reserved for primary legislation. See, for
example, Regina v. Forbes [2001] UKHL 40 (U.K.), in which the House of Lords—at the time,
the highest appellate court in England and Wales—had to determine whether a literal or
purposive approach to construing the words of a key provision of the code of practice on
identification procedures was required.
84. Code of Practice, supra note 21.
85. In criminal trials, judges have broad discretion to exclude prosecution evidence
where its reception would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial. See Police and
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 78 (Eng.).
86. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 106(1)(d) (U.K.).
87. Id. § 135(1).
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enabled or networked devices and any other devices capable of
being used in connection with such equipment. Cables, wires and
storage devices (such as USB storage devices, CDs or hard disks
[sic] drives).”88
Any interference authorized by a warrant must be for the
purpose of obtaining “communications,” “equipment data,” or
“any other information.”89 Clearly, there is no significant restriction
here. The concept of a “communication” is very broad. It includes
any files containing speech, music, sounds visual images “or data
of any description.”90 “Equipment data” is defined in terms that
encompass not only information about email and IP addresses, but
any data that can be used to identify or assist in identifying any
person, event, or the location of events and people.91 Some forms of
equipment interference—taking control of a computer and tracking
keystrokes or activating a webcam, for example—make it possible
to monitor, observe, or listen to a person’s communications, and to
record anything that is seen, heard, or discovered.
The potential scope of an equipment interference warrant also
depends on the number of devices covered by the warrant. The IPA
envisages warrants of varying scope, and the Code refers to two
categories. The first, a non-thematic warrant, is narrower and
authorizes interference with equipment belonging to a particular
person or organization, or with equipment at a particular location.
The second category, a thematic warrant, will be considerably
broader, as it relates to equipment that is linked by a common
theme; it may “cover a wide range of activity, cover a wide
geographical area, or involve the acquisition of a significant
volume of data.”92 An interference warrant will be valid initially for
six months and can subsequently be renewed for an additional
six months.
The United Kingdom’s statutory regime for equipment
interference not only enables hacking by police themselves; it also
confers power to co-opt communications providers in this
endeavor by serving the warrant on any person who may be able
to provide assistance—telecommunications operators, for example.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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The Code suggests that law enforcement officers should attempt to
work co-operatively with those who might provide assistance, but
they have a power—subject to approval by the U.K. Secretary of
State—to “impose a duty” to assist.93 The Code also explains that
the assistance sought will usually be the provision of infrastructure
(though no indication is given as to the nature of such
infrastructure) or information about the technical specification of
relevant equipment.
The concept of privacy is central to the structure and rationale
of the legislation. Section 1 of the IPA explains that the purpose of
the legislation, generally, is “to set out the extent to which certain
investigatory powers may be used to interfere with privacy.”94
Section 2 of the IPA requires those issuing and renewing warrants
to have regard to several broad considerations:
A. whether what is sought to be achieved by the
warrant, authorization, or notice could
reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive
means,
B. whether the level of protection to be applied in
relation to any obtaining of information by
virtue of the warrant, authorization, or notice is
higher because of the particular sensitivity of
that information,95
C. the public interest in the integrity and security of
telecommunication systems and postal services,
and
D. any other aspects of the public’s interest in the
protection of privacy.96
Section 1 goes on to state that protections for privacy can be
found in various parts of the IPA. The part that regulates
equipment interference requires the person issuing a warrant—the
chief police officer—to justify the application in terms that mirror

93. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 128; Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶¶ 7.4, 7.9.
94. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 1(1).
95. Section 2(5) and sch. 7 para. 2(4), state that ‘sensitive information’ includes items
that are subject to legal privilege, information that might identify the source of journalistic
information, and information held in confidence by a member of a professional community,
e.g., medical records.
96. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 §§ 2(2)(a)-(d).
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the justificatory grounds for interference with the right to privacy
under Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The chief police officer must consider the warrant necessary for
preventing or detecting serious crime97 and proportionate to the
purpose of the interference.98 In relation to proportionality, the
Code explains that, in considering whether this condition is met,
the following should be considered:
A. the extent of the proposed interference with
privacy balanced against what is sought to be
achieved;
B. how and why the methods to be adopted will
cause the least possible interference with the
privacy of the person and others;
C. whether the activity is an appropriate use of the
IPA and a reasonable way, having considered all
reasonable alternatives, of achieving what is
sought to be achieved;
D. what other methods, where appropriate, were
either not implemented or have been employed
but are assessed as insufficient to fulfil
operational objectives without the use of the
proposed investigatory power;
E. whether there are any implications of the
conduct authorized by the warrant for the
privacy and security of other users of equipment
and systems, including the internet, and an
explanation of why (if relevant) it is nevertheless
proportionate to proceed with the operation.99
There are further protections for privacy in the form of a
condition that limits the collection, copying, and dissemination of
information and material that is necessary for a number of
purposes prescribed in the IPA.100 The legislation also sets out
97. A “serious crime” is defined in § 263(1) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as
one for which a person aged 18 or over who “has no previous convictions could
reasonably . . . expect[] to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of [three] years or more,
or . . . [which] involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain, or is conduct
by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose.” Id. § 263(1).
98. Id. §§ 106(1)(a)–(b).
99. Code of Practice, supra note 20, at ¶ 4.20.
100. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 129.
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specific protections in relation to material that is subject to legal
privilege,101 confidential journalistic material,102 information that
identifies the sources of journalistic material,103 and
communications sent by or intended for members of the legislature
and the private information of such persons.104
The U.K. legislation neither prescribes nor proscribes any
particular form of equipment interference. An equipment
interference warrant will specify the object of the warrant—
equipment controlled by a particular person, installed at particular
locations, forming part of a network, etc.—but will not impose
conditions relating to the particular functionality of interference.
The legislation merely states that the “obtaining of communication
or other information” that is authorized includes “monitoring,
observing or listening to a person’s communications or other
activities.”105 A warrant authorizes “any conduct which it is
necessary to undertake to do what is expressly authorized or
required by the warrant.”106 The Code of Practice explains that
equipment interference warrants authorize both physical
interference with equipment and remote interference.107 Thus, the
U.K. legislation authorizes, prima facie, each of the forms of
hacking functionalities dealt with in the next Part of this Article.108
However, the requirement that those issuing interference warrants
consider the necessity and proportionality of the authorization
sought might act as a constraint on the form and functionality of
authorized interference. The Code of Practice explains that
proportionality, on which the issue of a warrant depends, will not
be met if the material that is sought could be obtained by less
intrusive means. An assessment of proportionality requires
consideration of “how and why the methods to be adopted will
cause the least possible interference with the privacy of the person
and others.”109

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. § 112.
Id. § 113.
Id. § 114.
Id. § 111.
Id. § 99(4)(a).
Id. § 99(5)(a).
Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶ 3.11.
See infra Part IV.
Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶ 4.20.
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E. United States
In the United States, scholars have begun to address police
malware—frequently referred to as a “network investigative
technique”110 (NIT) or “government hacking”111—in a variety of
contexts. Several federal courts have addressed government
hacking questions, most notably since 2016.112 Most of these cases
stem from FBI deployment of malware as part of two major online
sting operations beginning in 2011113 and 2014,114 although another
major investigation of twenty-three additional hidden websites
was also mounted in 2013.115 However, there is clear evidence that
the FBI has been using malware to support its investigations since
at least 2001.116 These investigations have led to criminal charges
not just in the United States, but also in other countries.117
In the earliest known judicial decision involving hacking by the
FBI, the FBI physically installed a keylogger onto a suspect’s
110. See, e.g., United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592 (E.D. Va. 2016); Kerr &
Murphy, supra note 21, at 59 n.7 (referring to NITs as presumably referring to “software used
to bypass security features controlling access to a computer”).
111. Kerr & Murphy, supra note 21, at 58; Mayer, supra note 1, at 580; Ohm, supra note
1, at 304.
112. Mayer, supra note 1, at 578 (“Through 2015, there were only a few federal opinions
on the practice. In 2016 and 2017, there were nearly a hundred . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275, 276 (8th Cir. 2016).
114. United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Ohm, supra note
1, at 304 (describing the Playpen investigation).
115. Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs.
that Access “Websites 1–23”, No. 8:13-mj-01744-WGC (D. Md. July 22, 2013); Affidavit in
Support of Application of Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access “Websites
1–23”, No. 8:13-mj-01744-WGC (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2016) (hereinafter In re Search, 2016
affidavit).
116. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 575–76 (citing United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d
572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001)) (“The earliest reported case is from 2001, when FBI agents snuck into
a mafioso’s office and installed a system for recording keystrokes.”); see also OFF. OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S IMPERSONATION OF A
JOURNALIST IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2016), https://oig.justice.gov/
reports/2016/o1607.pdf (detailing the FBI’s use of malware to identify the source of bomb
threats to a school in the summer of 2007). The Electronic Frontier Foundation also released
FBI documents pertaining to government use of malware referred to as a “web bug” or
“Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier” (CIPAV). See Endpoint Surveillance Tools
(CIPAV), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/foia-endpointsurveillance-tools-cipav (last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
117. Joseph Cox, Child Porn Sting Goes Global: FBI Hacked Computers in Denmark, Greece,
Chile, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 22, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_
us/article/qkj8q3/child-porn-sting-goes-global-fbi-hacked-computers-in-denmark-greecechile; Ohm, supra note 1, at 303.
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computer in an effort to discover the suspect’s passwords.118 In
another pre-2012 investigation, FBI agents posed as journalists,
writing a fake Associated Press article and sending a link to the
suspect’s social media account.119 When the suspect clicked the link,
his computer was infected with malware, reporting his IP address
to the FBI.120 In the 2013 “Freedom Hosting” investigation, the FBI
took control of a Tor hidden service (named “Freedom Hosting”)
to deliver malware to specific users under a warrant that
authorized them to access the following information: IP address,
operating system, whether the NIT had already been delivered to
the computer, host name, and MAC address.121
Generally, the FBI has relied on the authority of Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to apply for judicial warrants
authorizing their deployment of NITs.122 However, according to
one recent analysis,
about half of the district courts that have considered the issue
have—surprisingly—concluded that law enforcement hacking is
not necessarily a Fourth Amendment search, and that the most
common configuration of government malware is exempt from ex
ante judicial supervision.123

Prior to 2016, defendants would challenge these warrants,
arguing that magistrate judges in other districts did not have
jurisdiction to issue warrants covering searches outside their
districts (i.e., in other parts of the country).124 However, effective
December 1, 2016, Rule 41 was amended to explicitly allow
magistrate judges “with authority in any district where activities
related to a crime may have occurred” to issue warrants
encompassing the use of malware or “remote access” software “to
118. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
119. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 16; Mayer, supra note 1, 574–76.
120. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 16.
121. In re Search, 2016 affidavit, supra note 115 at 89–90; Mayer, supra note 1, at 588.
122. Indeed, as noted by one scholar, “It is not apparent whether federal law
enforcement agents have ever deployed malware without obtaining a search warrant.”
Mayer, supra note 1, at 599.
123. Id. at 582.
124. However, federal courts frequently held that suppression of the evidence obtained
through use of the malware in these cases was not necessary, even when the searches
violated the Fourth Amendment, under the exclusionary rule or the good faith exception
established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984), and United States v. Jones, 230
F. Supp. 3d 819, 823 (S.D. Ohio 2017).
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search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically
stored information located within or outside that district if . . . the
district where the media or information is located has been
concealed through technological means.”125 (The 2016 amendments
also allow a single magistrate judge to authorize the search of
computers located in “five or more districts”126 that have been
damaged by malware (e.g., in cases of “botnets”) in violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)).
In the dark web context—or whenever police do not know the
location or identity of a device or suspect (when investigatory
techniques are being used to identify the device’s or data’s location
and ownership)—the “government’s best chance of identifying
who is behind the crime and where he is requires tricking the target
into downloading malicious code.”127 This has led, for example, the
FBI to seek warrants authorizing them to remotely install software
onto target computers that has
the capacity to search the computer’s hard drive, random access
memory, and other storage media; to activate the computer’s
built-in camera; to generate latitude and longitude coordinates for
the computer’s location; and to transmit the extracted data to FBI
agents.128

As of November 5, 2018, there were seventeen federal appellate
court decisions involving a “network investigative technique”, as
well as numerous federal trial court decisions in hundreds of
different individual prosecutions.129 All of these decisions arose
within the context of just two federal child pornography
investigations,
“Operation
Torpedo”
(2011–12)
and
“Operation Pacifier” (2014–15), both part of the Department of

125. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
126. Id. 41(b)(6)(B).
127. Kerr & Murphy, supra note 21, at 59.
128. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d
753, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
129. We have identified 102 of these cases through a manual search and reading of
federal cases in Westlaw using the search terms: [adv: “network investigative technique”],
[adv: “Website A” & FBI & 2015], [adv: “child pornography” & (playpen OR “play pen” OR
pedobook OR pedoboard)], [adv: “child pornography” & NIT], and [adv: NIT & FBI]. See also
Mayer, supra note 1, at 578 (“Through 2015, there were only a few federal opinions on the
practice. In 2016 and 2017, there were nearly a hundred . . . .”).
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Justice’s “Project Safe Childhood Initiative.”130 Of the seventeen
appellate decisions, thirteen arose from the FBI’s investigation into
a popular child pornography website within the Tor network
(upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, or “Playpen”) as part of Operation
Pacifier. The remaining four appellate cases stemmed from
Operation Torpedo, involving the investigation of other dark web
sites (including “PedoBoard” and “PedoBook”).
Aside from the investigations into PedoBoard/PedoBook and
in the Scarfo and In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown cases, all other reported cases noted above appear to have
involved government hacking operations limited to functionality A
(described supra, in Section II.C)—that is, capturing specific types of
data, largely limited to information useful in identifying and
locating computers allegedly associated with accessing or
distributing child pornography. In Scarfo131 and the
PedoBoard/PedoBook investigation, the installation of a keylogger
presents an example of functionality D.1, or intercepting online
communications—specifically, any typed commands inputted by the
computer’s user (and, in the PedoBoard/PedoBook investigation,
the issued warrants also extended to capturing various other forms
of online communication).
In the In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown132 case, the FBI’s intended (but not authorized) hacking
activities extended to basically all functionalities A through E. The
judge ruling on the FBI’s warrant application denied the warrant
because it did not 1) meet the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment,133 or 2) meet the heightened requirements for
warrants authorizing video surveillance.134 The court noted that
video surveillance was “a potentially indiscriminate and most

130. Project Safe Childhood, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/psc (last
visited Feb. 18, 2020).
131. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001).
132. 958 F. Supp. 2d 753.
133. Id. at 758–59. The judge so found for the following reasons: 1) “The Government’s
application contains little or no explanation of how the Target Computer will be found,” and
2) “The Government’s application offers nothing but indirect and conclusory assurance that
its search technique will avoid infecting innocent computers or devices.” Id.
134. Id. at 759–61 (elaborating on the requirements for video surveillance warrants
within the Fifth Circuit).
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intrusive method of surveillance,” requiring additional safeguards
under Fifth Circuit precedent.135
Federal courts have issued contradictory opinions about the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment in many of these cases,
particularly those involving only the capture of specific types of
data about a computer and its location (functionality A). While the
delivery and execution stages in the malware utilization process
may also implicate the Fourth Amendment in some circumstances,
the bigger question is whether the exploitation (electronic access to
a suspect’s device) or reporting (sending information back to the
government) stages ought to implicate Fourth Amendment
concerns.136 Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
merely touching a suspect’s physical property can constitute a
Fourth Amendment search, and some circuit courts have
analogized these physical “closed container” searches to those
conducted of electronic devices.137 On the other hand, metadata,138
which is essentially the type of information obtained under
functionality A, is generally not protected by the Fourth
Amendment.139 Hence,
[l]aw enforcement hacking thus poses a Fourth Amendment
conundrum. It shares a key feature of physical device searches:
135. Id. at 759–60 (quoting United States v. Cuevas–Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir.
1987)).
136. Mayer, supra note 1, at 589 (“If there is any constitutional privacy
protection associated with this form of malware, it must reside in the exploitation and
reporting steps.”).
137. Id. at 590–92; see United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718–19 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t
seems natural that computers should fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or
other personal items that command a high degree of privacy.”) (internal quotation and
citation omitted); see also United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“Individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home
computers.”); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402–04 (4th Cir. 2001); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d
325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
138. Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret
Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 10 ISJLP 481, 487–88 (2014) (“Metadata . . .
includes . . . information about the time, duration, and location of a communication as well
as the phone numbers or email addresses of the sending and receiving parties. It also may
include information about the device used, for example, the make/model and specific device
identification number.”).
139. See id. at 492–93 (discussing limited privacy protections for non-content
information under the Fourth Amendment). An exception is cell-site location data held by a
wireless service provider, which has received Fourth Amendment protection. See Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Possibly, the Supreme Court may craft other future
exceptions to the general rule that metadata does not acquire Constitutional protections.
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the government obtains data directly from the suspect’s device.
But it also shares key features of compelling data from a service
provider: there is no physical contact with the suspect’s property,
and the data that the government obtains can be conceptually
divided into content and metadata categories.140

Mayer has argued that law enforcement “unambiguously
engage[s] in a Fourth Amendment search” when it delivers
malware to a suspect’s device because it “involves law enforcement
officers physically interacting with a suspect’s device,” or,
separately, when a piece of malware captures and “transmits the
contents of a communication or a file.”141 However, in most
functionality A cases, at least those dealing with the capture of
information like IP addresses, it is not clear that either of these
conclusions would apply.142 With this limited functionality, has the
device been touched or accessed by law enforcement?
III. HACKING FUNCTIONALITIES AND PRIVACY INTERESTS
In this Part, we discuss how lawmakers and courts have framed
the privacy interest(s) at issue when allowing certain functionalities
of police hacking for investigatory purposes. What were
lawmakers’ primary concerns, and which constitutionally
guaranteed privacy types, if any, did they apply? Does legislative
history indicate whether lawmakers felt that existing constitutional
frameworks sufficiently addressed the intrusiveness of police
hacking? In the sections that follow, we examine how privacy
considerations have arisen in connection to the functionalities of
police hacking identified above in Section II.C.143
A. Capturing Specific Types of Data
Some of the jurisdictions we studied regulate the capture of
certain specific types of data separately from, or differently than,
more comprehensive data searches. This is perhaps based on the

140. Mayer, supra note 1, at 594.
141. Id. at 594–95.
142. Id. at 596 (“Courts have consistently held that an IP address is constitutionally
unprotected metadata, much like a telephone number.”).
143. We will not discuss functionality F—remotely deleting unlawful data—since this
is only encountered in Dutch law and involves risks for the integrity and availability of
computer data rather than privacy risks to confidentiality of data.
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idea that such targeted use of police hacking powers, limited to
specific types of data necessary for an investigation, is less intrusive
than more comprehensive access to various types of data.
This distinction is seen in the content/non-content distinction
in U.S. Fourth Amendment law (although, as discussed above,
police hacking does challenge this general rule). If the application
is to acquire non-content (metadata) information about electronic
or wire communications, the federal Pen Registers and Trap and
Trace Devices chapter of Title 18144 (the “Pen/Trap Statute”)
applies, providing statutory rules that govern in place of the
standard Rule 41 warrant requirements. A pen-register order
allows law enforcement to acquire “dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information,”145 while a trap-and-trace order allows them
to capture “incoming electronic or other impulses which identify
the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a
wire or electronic communication.”146 Neither of these orders can
authorize the collection of the “contents of any communication.”147
In practice, it appears the FBI may have (at least at one time) settled
on a two-part process for deploying what has been referred to as a
Computer and Internal Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV) in
conjunction with additional measures designed to collect
additional information, acquiring an initial “search warrant to
authorize intrusion into the computer” followed by an application
for an order under the Pen/Trap Statute “to authorize the
surveillance done by the spyware.”148
FBI hacking techniques often implicate this functionality
(capturing specific types of information). In the PedoBook/PedoBoard
cases,149 FBI agents had taken control of an illicit child pornography
site and had inserted malware into the code of the site that would
infect users’ computers and instruct them to report the “user’s IP
144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2018).
145. Id. § 3127(3).
146. Id. § 3127(4).
147. Id. § 3127(3)–(4).
148. Jennifer Lynch, New FBI Documents Provide Details on Government’s Surveillance
Spyware, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2011/04/new-fbi-documents-show-depth-government.
149. United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cottom, 679
F. App’x 518 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275 (8th Cir. 2016).
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address, the date and time the user accessed the content, and his or
her computer’s operating system.”150 The technique used by the FBI
exploited the user’s computer by exploiting a vulnerability within
the Adobe Flash plugin.151 In investigating the creator of the site,
Aaron McGrath, the FBI also acquired a warrant allowing them to
install keylogging software in order to “allow law enforcement to
obtain the passwords and pass-phrases necessary to access
McGrath’s computers as well as the electronic files stored on those
computers and to access communications between McGrath and
others currently unknown to law enforcement.”152 Subsequently,
the FBI obtained additional warrants allowing them to intercept
private messages and other electronic communications sent
through the hidden service for as long as needed to “fully reveal”
the “identity of the target subjects or information that may be useful
in establishing their identity.”153
In the Playpen cases,154 the FBI was investigating users of a
popular child pornography website hosted on the “dark web”155
within the Tor network.156 The FBI gained control of the site’s
servers and “relocated the website content to servers in a secure
government facility” in Virginia.157 Next, in order to identify users,
who were “still cloaked by the Tor encryption technology,”158
agents acquired a warrant that permitted them to use malware to
infect the computers of any “user who logged into the target

150. Welch, 811 F.3d at 278.
151. United States v. Cottom, Nos. 8:13CR108, 8:15CR239, 2015 WL 9308226, at *3 (D.
Neb. Dec. 22, 2015) (describing the technique); Mayer, supra note 1, at 587.
152. United States v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR107, 2016 WL 4179365, at *3 (D. Neb. Aug.
5, 2016).
153. Id.
154. United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hammond,
740 F. App’x 573 (9th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
2018); United States v. Torres, 740 F. App’x 54 (5th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v.
Randolph, 725 F. App’x 249 (4th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v. Jean, 891 F.3d 712 (8th
Cir. 2018); United States v. Lough, 721 F. App’x 291 (4th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v.
Tagg, 886 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2018);
United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316
(1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017).
155. McLamb, 880 F.3d at 686.
156. Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1111.
157. Horton, 863 F.3d at 1045.
158. Id.
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website.”159 The malware infected any computer that logged into
the Playpen website, causing the users’ computers to transmit
“seven pieces of identifying information”160 back to the
government, including:
(1) the computer’s IP address and the date and time that it was
determined; (2) a unique identifier to distinguish data from that
of other computers accessing Playpen; (3) the computer’s
operating system; (4) information about whether the NIT had
already been delivered to the computer; (5) the computer’s host
name; (6) the operating system’s username; and (7) the
computer’s media access control [MAC] address.161

Across the Atlantic, the Dutch regulation of police hacking
regulates the collection of certain characteristics of the computer or
its user, such as the computer’s location or the user’s identity, as a
separate functionality of police hacking (considered a digital
variant of the physical sneak-and-peak operation162). These types of
searches are subject to less strict procedural requirements than
remote searches or the deletion of data (functionalities B, C, and F),
but have the same requirements as hacking to facilitate interception
or observation (functionalities D and E).
The use of police hacking for the purpose of locating offenders
is also discussed in German doctrine, although it is not regulated as
a separate functionality. Rather, it is discussed as one of the few
cases where the use of police hacking is justifiable from the
perspective of the necessity. A number of German scholars are
critical of the wide scope163 and intrusiveness of the newly
introduced provisions164 and question the proportionality and
necessity of the regulation.165 The determination of the location
of perpetrators who use advanced anonymization technology to
hide their IP address is recognized as an exception in this sense,

159. Randolph, 725 F. App’x at 250.
160. Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1112.
161. United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2018).
162. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 19 (Neth.).
163. LISA BLECHSCHMITT, STRAFVERFOLGUNG IM DIGITALEN ZEITALTER 361–66, 365
(2018) (Ger.).
164. See, e.g., Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 19; Roggan, supra note 53, at 827; Michael
Soiné, Die strafprozessuale Online-Durchsuchung, 38 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 497,
497–504 (2018) (Ger.).
165. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 19; Roggan, supra note 53, at 828.
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since it can hardly be pursued otherwise than through the use of
police hacking.166
B. Remote Search of Stored Data
In the United States, as mentioned earlier, there is little doctrine
or case law directly covering the legality of remote searches of
stored data using police hacking techniques, although it seems clear
that these would generally amount to Fourth Amendment searches,
at least insofar as the search might extend beyond merely acquiring
non-content data.167 In the FBI’s ill-fated application for a warrant
in the In re Warrant To Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown168 case, the FBI had sought the ability to remotely search
the hard drive and RAM of the suspect’s computer. This sort of
request (or hacking) may be occurring (indeed, it is the specific type
of functionality addressed in the 2016 changes to Rule 41), but its
occurrence is not (yet) otherwise apparent in available case law.
In the promulgation of the 2016 amendments to Rule 41, the
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (which developed the
amendments), promoted the expanded magistrate powers to
explicitly authorize “remote access to search electronic storage
media,” at least in part, as a response and remedy (rather than a
threat) to the invasion of privacy experienced by computer users
who had had their computers infected with illegal malware under
18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5). The Committee asserted that remote access
would allow for more efficient investigations of complex computer
crimes, such as those using botnets.169
The most common public comments in opposition to the
proposed rule changes were related to privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, including comments arguing that remote searches
would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity

166. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 19.
167. Of course, law enforcement resorts to utilizing orders available under the Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2713 (2018), as another way for investigators to
acquire stored communications data, but this process does not involve police hacking.
168. 958 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
169. Hon. Reena Raggi, Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Report of the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, USCOURTS.GOV 9 (May 6, 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/2015-05-criminal_rules_report_0.pdf. Notably, however, the amendment
and supporting documentation do not explicitly authorize law enforcement to disinfect
computers or otherwise delete data.
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requirement.170 However, the committee (excepting one dissenting
member) explicitly defended its changes as procedural, not
substantive, and thus outside the remit of Fourth Amendment
concerns.171 The comments in opposition to the changes, in the
committee’s view, did not consider “the real need for amendment
to allow the government to respond effectively to the threats posed
by technology [such as] serious offenses to jeopardize . . .
individual privacy.”172 The committee was “confident that judges
will address Fourth Amendment requirements on a case-by-case
basis both in issuing warrants under these amendments and in
reviewing them when challenges are made thereafter”173 and that
“[j]udicial review of warrant applications better ensures Fourth
Amendment rights and enhances privacy.”174 In response to the
dissenting view of one member of the committee that, “[f]or many
people, computers are their lives, and . . . that these privacy
concerns should be considered in the first instance by Congress,”
the rest of the committee argued that “computers are no more
sacrosanct than homes, and search warrants for homes have long
been issued ex parte and reviewed in back-end litigation.”175
Subsequently, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States (the
national policy-making body for the U.S. federal courts) adopt the
amendments as proposed by the advisory committee, only briefly
noting the privacy-related concerns.176
Elsewhere, the German regulation of so-called online searches
in Section 100b of the German CCP includes a widespread and
rather indefinite permission for law enforcement to intervene and
collect information from computers. By not limiting the scope of
data collection to concrete types of data, the regulation potentially
allows the collection of all types of data, either by making a
bitstream copy of the discs or enabling complete external control of

170. Id. at 11–12.
171. Id. at 9–10, 13–14.
172. Id. at 13.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 14.
175. Id.
176. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Summary of the Report of the Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, USCOURTS.GOV 26 (Sept. 2015),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/st09-2015_0.pdf.
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the system.177 The provision enables comprehensive monitoring of
the use of the computer, including reading the storage media, and
access to data generated prior to the order allowing the
investigatory conduct (unlike source telecommunications
interception) as well as future data generated during the duration
of the measure.178 However, the measure must always be limited
to data relevant to the ongoing criminal proceedings and data that
can be assumed to be evidence-related. Therefore, the
comprehensive investigation of the whole computer system is
fundamentally precluded.179
The measure must also be subsidiary to other investigative
means and may only be used if other techniques, such as an overt
search, do not suffice.180 This principle has also been expressed by
the German Federal Constitutional Court, which stated that overt
access to such data must take priority over secret infiltration, and it
must be demonstrated why an overt search does not promise
success before an online search can be authorized.181 Considering
this, some authors express confusion as to which gaps in existing
powers the new regulation is supposed to fill, since in most cases
access to data is readily available in the context of overt seizure of
the data carriers. Other than determining locations, discussed in the
previous section, an application related to full-disk encryption is
suggested, although the provision itself makes no reference to
encryption technology.182 Perhaps the main advantage for law
enforcement, in comparison to overt searches, is the covert
character of online searches. However, if this is the motivation for
the new provision, then it is creating a new type of power
exclusively related to computer investigations that does not
have an equivalent in traditional searches, since there are no
comparable provisions to covertly seize objects in the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
The newly introduced online search is widely considered the
most intrusive investigation measure in the German CCP.
Contemporary computers and smartphones process and store a
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 18.
Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171.
Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2646–47.
Id. at 2647.
Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 22.
Id. at 19.
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large variety of data from all walks of life which potentially allow
secretive creation of comprehensive personality profiles.183
Recognizing these risks (in the context of preventive police
powers), the German Constitutional Court considered it
particularly necessary to protect citizens from such interference. It
considered existing provisions of the Basic Law, including the
protection of informational self-determination, the inviolability of
the home, and the secrecy of communications, but found these
existing protections insufficient. Therefore, the court interpreted
the Basic Law, on the basis of the protection of human dignity184
and the protection of the free development of individual
personality,185 to protect the (newly created) fundamental right to
confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems.
All covert infiltrations of computers with the aim to obtain
data stored in them must be measured against this standard, which
places particularly high demands on the justification of
such interventions.186
The German Constitutional Court compared the intensity of
fundamental rights interference of the secret infiltration of
computer systems to the interference with the inviolability of the
home.187 Due to this, the legislature designed the procedural
requirements for online searches to be identical to those of the
acoustic surveillance of the home.188 Therefore, the integrity and
confidentiality of computer systems and the inviolability of the
home are now considered to be of equal importance,189 although
they remain separate legal goods.190 Thus, online searches are not
measured against the constitutional standard protecting the
183. Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
184. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 1, translation at https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.).
185. GG art. 2.
186. Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
187. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 21.
188. Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171.
189. Part of the literature considers the intensity of intervention in cases of police
hacking to be even higher than cases of acoustic monitoring of the home. See Freiling et al.,
supra note 3, at 18–19; Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
190. Legal goods (Rechtsgüter), in German doctrine, are societal values and interests,
which are recognized as worthy of protection in the legal order due to their utility either for
individuals or the general public. VOLKER KREY AND ROBERT ESSER, DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 7 (W. Kohlhammer 2016) (Ger.). The notion also plays an important role
in Italian law (bene giuridico) and, to a lesser extent, in Dutch law (rechtsgoed).
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inviolability of the home (even when the computer system is
located inside a home) and are not allowed to breach the protection
of the home by, for example, secretly entering the home to infiltrate
a computer system.191
Interestingly, the Dutch regulation of remote computer
searches, which allows the authorities to secure data stored on the
computer (in article 126nba of the Dutch CCP), also seems to be
inspired by the provisions on oral interception inside a dwelling.
Since the remote search is considered the most privacy-intrusive
form of remote access, the procedural requirements have been set
up to be identical to oral interception inside the home.192 However,
not much specific attention has been paid to the protection of the
home in the legislative history of article 126nba of the Dutch CCP.193
Since the safeguards for using legal hacking are high compared to
most other investigation powers, it apparently is not very relevant
whether remotely accessed computers are located in a dwelling or
elsewhere—it is the computer itself that is being protected against
intrusions through the relatively high safeguards.
In Italy, digital searches are not clearly regulated in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, and this applies a fortiori to remote searches,
which are neither explicitly allowed nor excluded. Measures not
explicitly regulated are often classified under the generic heading
of “atypical means of searching for evidence,” which is governed
by article 189 of the Italian CCP. The primary judgment on using a
Trojan to covertly copy data from computers dates from 2009, in
which the Italian Supreme Court held that covertly installing a
device on a computer to acquire the files stored on it was an atypical
means of searching for evidence, for which a motivated order from
the Public Prosecutor suffices; in this case, there was such an order,
given on the basis of article 234 of the Italian CCP to acquire
documents (prova documentale).194 According to the Court, the
secrecy of communications was not at issue because the program

191. Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171.
192. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 29 (Neth.).
193. Significantly, the lengthy discussion in the Explanatory Memorandum of the
protection of constitutional rights in relation to article 126nba of the Dutch CCP,
Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 50–56 (Neth.), is limited to the general right to
privacy and the right to secrecy of communications; nothing is said on a possible violation
of the right to inviolability of the home.
194. Cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556 (It.) (“Virruso”).
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did not intercept a flow of communications (which implies a
dialogue with other persons), but merely targeted the
unidirectional flow of data inside the computer’s circuits.195
Moreover, the Court did not consider the inviolability of the
home to be infringed because the computer was located in a public
office, open to a “community of people that was not particularly
extensive, but neither limited or a priori determinable on the basis
of a personal decision by the accused,” and hence not a
constitutionally protected type of place.196 Thus, unlike in Germany
and the Netherlands, where the location of the computer does not
appear to be of importance, computers in Italy appear to be more
strongly protected when located in constitutionally protected
places. This has been criticized in the literature: it misunderstands
the intrinsic place-independence of computers, in relation to the
(doctrinally constructed) protected legal good of “informatic
home” or “informatic privacy.” The Court’s argument leads to
protecting the data contained in a computer when this is located
inside a home, but not when it is located in public places,
completely ignoring the factual circumstance that—for instance,
through accessing the cloud—the subject can in both cases conduct
in both places activities with the same level of sensitiveness.197

A considerable number of Italian scholars consider online
covert searches for data retrieval to be unconstitutional198 for lack
of specific legal rules stipulating the conditions and modes of
operation and lack of necessary safeguards to limit the privacy
infringement to what is necessary.199 Nevertheless, the 2009

195. Id.; see also Mauro Trogu, Sorveglianza e “perquisizioni” on-line su materiale
informatico, in LE INDAGINI ATIPICHE 431, 448 (Adolfo Scalfati ed., Giappichelli Editore, 2014).
196. Trogu, supra note 195, at 448.
197. Giulia Lasagni, L’uso di captatori informatici (trojans) nelle intercettazioni “fra
presenti”,
DIRITTO
PENALE
CONTEMPORANEO
11–16
(2016),
https://www.
penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/LASAGNI_2016b.pdf; see also Trogu, supra note 195, at 448
(“[T]he individual who uses his portable personal computer on the public street would lose
the right to privacy on its contents, thus legitimating any public or private intrusion.”).
198. Note that in the Italian legal system, constitutionality is not ultimately decided by
the Supreme Court, but by the Constitutional Court. Scholars can therefore argue (on the
basis of constitutional arguments) that a law, or an interpretation of the law by the Supreme
Court, would not hold up when challenged before the Constitutional Court.
199. Lasagni, supra note 197, 11–16; Iovene, supra note 24, at 341–42 (2014); Stefano
Marcolini, Le cosiddette perquisizioni on line (o perquisizioni elettroniche), 7/8 CASSAZIONE
PENALE 2855, at 2866–67 (2010).
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judgment was confirmed in the 2012 Bisignani case by the Italian
Supreme Court.200 Interestingly, the prosecutor requested the
investigatory judge to authorize an “online search,” alongside an
authorization for oral interception, both on the basis of article 266
of the Italian CCP (interception of communications). However, the
judge had not considered such authorization necessary for the
online search, as, according to the 2009 judgment, a motivated
order from the prosecutor would suffice. This was upheld by the
Supreme Court.201
C. Remote Monitoring of Computer Use
Although the legal provisions in some jurisdictions generally
do not distinguish between a one-off remote search of data stored
in a computer and longer-term monitoring of computer use, the
latter is recognized as significantly more intrusive in the literature
and case law of other jurisdictions. In the United States, ongoing
searches (e.g., location tracking or wiretapping warrants) must
typically be explicitly allowed in the legitimating warrant or court
order. Likewise, police hacking operations that extend
prospectively for a period of time should also be explicitly
approved under ongoing warrants.202 Importantly, if the remote
monitoring
encompasses
the
collection
of
electronic
communications content (including the capture of text-based
communications), police must acquire a “continuously valid superwarrant” under the federal Wiretap Act203 (this requirement is
mostly relevant to functionality D, discussed in the following
section, but would also apply here in appropriate cases). Remote
monitoring of computer use was also one of the functionalities
requested by the government in its failed warrant application in In
re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown.204

200. Vaciagio & Ramalho, supra note 36, at 92 (citing Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012,
n. 254865 (It.) (“Bisignani”)).
201. See Lasagni, supra note 197, 11–16 (citing Marco Torre, Il virus di Stato nel diritto
vivente tra esigenze investigative e tutela dei diritti fondamentali, 9 DIR. PEN. PROC. 1163,
1167 (2015)).
202. Mayer, supra note 1, at 628–29.
203. Id. at 629; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–11, 2518.
204. In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d
753 (S.D. Tex. 2013).

1041

003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:39 PM

2019

In Germany, some authors point out that the official legal term
used for police hacking—”online search”—is misleading. Whereas
a classic search is a one-off, limited measure, from the wording of
Section 100b of the German CCP it is evident that, by means of the
“online search,” data may be continuously collected over an
extended period.205 Consequently, police could access data already
existing at the time of ordering the measure as well as newly
created data, including (future) stored emails, text messages,
photographs, video files, social media contacts, etc. Furthermore,
the measure can also be used to give law enforcement “live access”
to data which is only plainly visible on the computer system
temporarily. This can be compared to secretly glancing over the
shoulder of the computer user to monitor all their digital
activities.206 As such, rather than a search, this constitutes
comprehensive covert surveillance of the computer.207
Naturally, such collection must be restricted to data relevant to
the investigation at hand and should be described as precisely as
possible in the court order to comply with the proportionality
principle. Truly comprehensive monitoring is not permissible in
most cases.208 Nevertheless, the online search is a considerably
more serious violation of fundamental rights than
telecommunications surveillance or overt searches and seizures
because it takes place covertly and can extend over a longer period,
monitoring the entire usage of a computer system.209 Therefore,
duration contributes to the infringement of fundamental rights.
Since such monitoring potentially gives law enforcement agents
access to an extremely large and meaningful set of data, such
collection places a heavy weight on the personality of the person
concerned and goes beyond the individual data collections
protected by the right to informational self-determination.210 The
German Constitutional Court compares the intensity of an online
search to the intensity of secret surveillance of the home.211 Yet, the
surveillance of the home under Section 100c of the German CCP is
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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Roggan, supra note 53, at 825.
Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 13.
Id.
Roggan, supra note 53, at 826.
Id.
BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, Apr. 20, 2016, Rn. 210 (Ger.).
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limited to acoustic surveillance, while the diversity and volume of
data accessed during online searches facilitate more far-reaching
conclusions about the personality of the affected individual. This
would make it more comparable to repeated covert home
searches and monitoring, which are not allowed under the German
Basic Law.212
The difference between one-time searches and extended
monitoring has also been recognized in Italian doctrine. Although
corresponding powers have not yet been incorporated into
statutory law, some guidance can be found in existing case law.
Various authors criticize the lack of statutory regulation, arguing
that these forms of hacking significantly infringe constitutional
rights (secrecy of communications, inviolability of the home,
and/or the right to privacy).213 According to Palmieri, rather than a
“violation,” it would be more correct to speak of an “attack” on the
fundamental right to privacy.214
Discussing a 2009 Italian Supreme Court judgment that
involved a Trojan that was used to monitor a computer for eight
months, some authors held that the Trojan at issue did not
constitute a form of a search because it did not aim to find existing
information, but also to find future information, which is
intrinsically different.215 In the 2012 Ryanair case, the police used
spyware to capture real-time traveler data in an online booking
system.216 The court found this use of spyware distinguishable from
traditional search and seizure, which takes place on the basis of
existing suspicion, as it was targeted at finding new information
that might lead to a concrete suspicion; this turns the Trojan into an
exploratory surveillance measure, which, in that respect, is similar
to interception of communications and is not allowed under current
law.217 This may suggest that there is a difference between using a
Trojan to covertly copy existing data (which would be allowed on
the basis of acquiring documental evidence or, possibly, a search)
and using it to monitor future data entered into a system (which
would not be allowed in the absence of specific legal rules for this
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Roggan, supra note 53, at 826.
See, e.g., Torre, supra note 14, at 18, 20; Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60.
Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60.
Iovene, supra note 24, at 339.
Torre, supra note 14, at 48.
Cass., sez. IV, 17 aprile 2012 n. 19618 (It.) (“Ryanair”).
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form of surveillance). In the Occhionero case,218 the defense argued
that a Trojan had been used to capture real-time data on the screen
or on the device—e.g., by taking screenshots—but not (only) to
capture data flowing from a computer to the web. The court merely
ruled that the former might lead to exclusion of evidence, but that
it is up to the defense to specify which captured data exactly
are unusable.219
Although the courts in Italy have been relatively permissive in
relation to remote searches, authors tend to conclude that
legislative intervention is required before Trojans can be employed,
based on what they perceive as the main legal goods at stake.
According to Trogu, the primary legal good is the “informatic
home” (which has been conceptualized in law and doctrine on the
hacking offense220). The informatic home is a constitutionally
protected virtual space (but also physical space in which the
informatic data are contained) over which the owner can exercise
the jus prohibendi (the right to prevent people from entering) and jus
admittendi (the right to admit people of one’s choice) towards third
persons, with a legitimate expectation of privacy.221 And since it is
the informatic home that is at stake, covert remote investigations of
computers are most similar to making video recordings (of noncommunicative behavior) inside the home, which is not allowed.222
For a more detailed discussion of the concept of the informatic
home see infra Section V.B.1.
Other scholars of Italian law offer further reflection on the legal
good at issue in remote monitoring. Iovene argues that what is at
issue is no longer a matter only of data protection or informational
self-determination, but more fundamentally one of the right to
personality. It is necessary, she argues, “to protect the informatic
system as a space in which the individual expresses his personality,
regardless of the nature of the information entrusted to it.”223
Finding the concept of informatic home insufficient, she proposes

218. Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (It.) (“Occhionero”).
219. Id. at 7–8.
220. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Italian Law 17–22 (TILT
Law & Technology Working Paper Series, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888422, for a
brief discussion.
221. Trogu, supra note 195, at 434 (citing Cass., sez. VI, 4 ottobre 1999, n. 3067 (It.)).
222. Trogu, supra note 195, at 447.
223. Iovene, supra note 24, at 334.
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the concept of informatic privacy to enable controlling what happens
with information. Thus, it is “informatic privacy” (riservatezza
informatica) that is the legal good to be protected, which can be
described as the “exclusive interest, legally recognised, to enjoy,
dispose, and control the digitized information, processes, systems
and ‘spaces,’ and their uses.”224 For more on the concept of
informatic privacy see infra Section V.B.2.
Torre, seeing that the computer functions nowadays as an
actual “appendix” of the person and his most fundamental self,
argues that police hacking enables an infringement of individual
intimacy that touches upon the inviolability of the mind, and
therewith triggers human dignity. After all, the real-time
monitoring that police hacking implies suggests that “what is being
written in a file and subsequently erased can be captured.”225 Thus,
it seems that Torre ultimately considers human dignity to be the
core legal good at issue and recommends treating this as a
constitutional right associated with proper constitutional
safeguards to regulate infringements of this right. The Italian focus
on the protection of individual personality and its free expression226
and human dignity of the individual227 resembles the German
constitutional case law in which the right to confidentiality and
integrity of computer system are held to be an expression of
precisely these two values.
D. Intercepting Communications
1. Intercepting electronic communications (wiretapping)
One of the most-cited reasons for introducing police hacking
has been the inability of law enforcement to access the content of
encrypted communications. The main solution proposed and
adopted in several jurisdictions is source telecommunications
224. Id. at 335 (quoting Roberto Flor, Phishing, identity theft, e identity abuse. Le prospettive
applicative del diritto penale vigente, 50 RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN. 899 (2007)).
225. Torre, supra note 14, at 87. Also, Palmieri emphasizes that the use of Trojans
“borders on controlling the mind,” touching upon “opinions and thoughts” rather than
“actions and behaviors.” Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60–61 (citing Alfredo Gaito & Sandro
Furfaro, Intercettazioni: esigenze di accertamento e garanzie della riservatezza, in I PRINCIPI EUROPEI
DEL PROCESSO PENALE 363, 364 (Alfredo Gaito ed., Giuridica Editrice 2016) (It.); PAOLO TONINI
& CARLOTTA CONTI, IL DIRITTO DELLE PROVE PENALI 482 (Giuffrè Editore 2014) (It.)).
226. Iovene, supra note 24, at 334.
227. Torre, supra note 14, at 87.
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interception. From a technical point of view, source
telecommunications interception is also similar to other
functionalities of police hacking since it also requires secret
intrusion into the computer system. The difference lies in the scope
of the collected data.228
In the United States, the interception of oral, electronic, and
wire communications is governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968229 (the “Wiretap Act,” codified
in sections 2710–22 of the U.S. Code), as amended by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),230 requiring a “super
warrant” with heightened application requirements for law
enforcement. These heightened requirements generally apply to
(wireless) network interception, keystroke logging, and a variety of
other forms of interception.231 Congress updated the Wiretap Act in
1986 to cover electronic communications232 (alongside existing
regulations for interception of oral and wire communications),
explicitly doing so as a response to the “development of new
methods of communication and devices for surveillance” as well as
dramatic expansion in “the opportunity for such intrusions” and
“the arbitrary use of Government power to maintain surveillance
over citizens.”233 The drafting of the legislation was spurred by the
idea that determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed in any given case—the Fourth Amendment standard—was

228. Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
229. Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197.
230. Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848.
231. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 639–40 (citing Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920, 926–36
(9th Cir. 2013) (applying the Wiretap Act to wireless network interception); United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69–85 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that email interception is covered
under the Wiretap Act); Luis v. Zang, No. 1:11-cv-884, 2013 WL 811816, at *4–9 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 5, 2013) (reviewing litigation on keyloggers and concluding that, if malware reports
keystrokes to a remote party, it implicates the Wiretap Act); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv1104, 2012 WL 4049484, at *37–44 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2012) (holding that screen capture
software that recorded email activity was covered by the Wiretap Act)).
232. The law defines “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects
interstate or foreign commerce” with some exceptions, including “any wire or oral
communication” as defined in the same section. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2018).
233. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986).
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“not always clear or obvious” in the context of communications
interception.234 According to the Senate Report on the ECPA,
[T]remendous advances in telecommunications and computer
technologies have carried with them comparable technological
advances in surveillance devices and techniques. Electronic
hardware making it possible for overzealous law enforcement
agencies, industrial spies, and private parties to intercept the
personal or proprietary communications of others are readily
available in the American market today.235

Additionally, the Senate reported that the ECPA represented “a
fair balance between the privacy expectations of American citizens
and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies,” and that
“[p]rivacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or
it will gradually erode as technology advances.”236 As such,
“Congress must act to protect the privacy of our citizens. If we do
not, we will promote the gradual erosion of this precious right.”237
The Wiretap Act covers the collection of the contents of
communications as they are in transit, as opposed to metadata
(covered by the Pen/Trap Statute) or the contents of the
communication after they are relegated to electronic storage
(covered by Rule 41 or the Stored Communications Act).238 It
authorizes judges to issue warrants for police interception of wire,
oral, or electronic communications, with some limitations.
Specifically, judges may order wiretapping only “within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting” as
well as “outside that jurisdiction but within the United States in the
case of a mobile interception device.”239 The definition of “mobile
interception device” has been met with some disagreement by
federal courts.240 The Tenth Circuit has held that “mobile
interception device” refers to a “mobile device for intercepting

234. Id. at 4 (quoting a statement made by the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice in response to a letter from Senator Leahy).
235. Id. at 3.
236. Id. at 5.
237. Id.
238. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13 (2018).
239. Id. § 2518(3).
240. Michael Koch, If Technology Is the Hare, Is Congress the Tortoise? Split Circuits in the
Wake of Dahda, 59 B.C. L. REV. 45, 45–46 (2018). Compare United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d
1101 (10th Cir. 2017), with United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997).
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communications,”241 while the Seventh Circuit has defined it as “a
device for intercepting mobile communications.”242
Because many instances of police hacking involve searches of
computers in unknown locations, and because communications
interception is not subject to the expanded venue provisions
provided for under the 2016 amendments to Rule 41, authorizing
the interception of communications as part of hacking operations
becomes complicated. In either case, police applying for an
interception warrant must know that the target device is within the
court’s jurisdiction or, in the case of a mobile interception device, at
least within the United States. And, considering the differing
definitions of mobile interception device across circuits, it may not
always be clear whether that provision applies to the mobility of
the interception device or of the targeted device. Thus, in some
contexts and in some circuits, it may be difficult (or unlikely) that a
wiretap warrant could be issued prior to the collection of additional
information about the target device, including its location. As such,
these measures might be employed only as a secondary hacking
technique and only after other functionalities have revealed the
prerequisite information.
In Germany, this functionality has been regulated separately as
a less intrusive form of police hacking. The measure is subsidiary
to the traditional telecommunications interception and only
possible when the traditional form of wiretapping along the line is
not possible.243 It is limited to ongoing communications from the
time of the order244 and it is neither permissible for the police to
access communications from before that period nor, for example,
the content of draft emails or draft messages not yet transmitted.245
Since it can only be used when traditional interception is not
possible, it is, in practice, limited to communications that are
encrypted in transit. By infiltrating the terminal equipment, law
enforcement can gain access before the communication is
encrypted or after it has been decrypted by the recipient.246

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
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Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853.
Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2648.
Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 170.
Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2648.
Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 10.
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One of the main reasons why this functionality of police
hacking is regulated separately in Germany is that the German
Constitutional Court has exempted ongoing communications from
the strict regime of protection that applies whenever the
investigative action infringes upon the right to confidentiality and
integrity of computers. Access to current communications, even by
means of police hacking, is protected by Article 10 of the Basic Law,
which protects the secrecy of communications and can be interfered
with under less stringent requirements.247 Article 10 is the sole
fundamental rights standard for source telecommunications
surveillance. However, technical and legal precautions must ensure
that monitoring is limited to data from ongoing
telecommunications processes. And if such restrictions fail, the
investigative action violates the right to confidentiality and
integrity of computer systems.248 The reason for excluding ongoing
telecommunications from the stricter regime is that it is coherent
with the social function of telecommunications and the
expectations of users, who make no detailed distinctions
between traditional telephony and mobile or internet
communications. Thus, accessing ongoing communications
through the terminal device can be seen as functionally equivalent
to traditional forms of interception.249
In Italy, although source telecommunications interceptions are
not regulated in statutory law, it appears that they are also
considered less intrusive, at least in comparison to oral interception
of communications. In Occhionero, a Trojan had been installed in the
(fixed) personal computer of the accused, ostensibly to intercept
telecommunications. The Court found this admissible, pointing
out that previous case law (Scurato) only concerned oral
interception, which was considered to be more invasive than
telecommunication interception.250
In the Netherlands, unlike in Italy and Germany, police hacking
to intercept telecommunications is apparently considered equally
intrusive as hacking for oral interception, given that they are

247. Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
248. Roggan, supra note 53, at 821–22.
249. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 21.
250. Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (It.) (citing Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n.
26889 (It.)).
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regulated together as one functionality of police hacking in article
126nba(1)(b) of the Dutch CCP.
2. Intercepting oral communications
Unlike telecommunications interception, which essentially
aims to get access to technically mediated (oral or electronic)
communications, oral interception aims to use the peripheral
equipment (microphones) of the computer to hear or record
communications taking place in the environment surrounding the
device. In the United States, interception of oral communications is
regulated under the Wiretap Act, described in the previous
subsection. Under the Act, “‘oral communication’ means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that
such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation.”251 In other respects, oral
interception is essentially treated the same as other forms of
wiretapping and might be accomplished by a variety of technical
means, although the computer intrusion necessary to deploy
software capable of activating a device’s microphone might also
need to be supported by a separate (e.g., Rule 41) warrant
authorizing a broader search and infiltration of the device.
In the Netherlands, both telecommunications and oral
interception are regulated as one functionality. Here, the remote
access facilitates intercepting electronic communications252 (e.g.
intercepting Skype conversations or incoming or out-going emails)
or oral interception253 (e.g., through a keylogging device
intercepting communication typed on the keyboard or to turn on
the computer’s microphone). One reason for introducing police
hacking was that the law previously allowed placing a bug in a
computer for oral interception purposes, but only by physical
means (entering a place and installing a bug in the keyboard or
computer). The law did not include the option of installing a bug
remotely, which hindered the investigation if the location of the
computer was unknown or if physical installation was too risky.
Allowing remote access for this purpose is advantageous because
it is not necessary to enter a dwelling to install the device, thus
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2018).
252. Art. 126m SV (Neth.).
253. Art. 126l SV (Neth.).
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avoiding infringement of article 12 of the Dutch Constitution
(protecting the home).254 It therefore appears that, at least in this
context, protecting the inviolability of the home is given priority
over protecting the integrity of computers, since the intrusion into
computers is considered justified by avoiding infringement of the
home. However, it may also merely reflect practical considerations,
such as the ability to conduct the investigation undetected,
which would be potentially compromised in the case of a
physical intrusion.
In Italy, the use of Trojans for intercepting communications—
particularly oral interception through turning on the computer’s
microphone—has triggered most legal discussion. In Bisignani, the
investigatory judge authorized this use of Trojans on the basis of
article 266(2) of the Italian CCP.255 However, since this article
stipulates that if communications among people present
(communicazioni tra presenti) take place in homes and places of
private abode (the places mentioned regarding trespass in article
614 of the Criminal Code), using Trojans is only allowed if there is
motivated reason to believe that the criminal activity is taking place
there. In the 2015 Musumeci case, the Italian Supreme Court found
that installing spyware on a portable device, which turned on the
microphone, was a form of oral interception and that this could
only take place “in clearly circumscribed places, identified at the
outset, and not wherever the subject might be.” The
court continued:
At issue is a technique . . . that presents specific characteristics and
that adds something with respect to the ordinary potential of
interception, constituted precisely by the possibility to capture
conversations between people present not only in a number of
places, according to the subject’s movements, but—and this
constitutes the problematic fulcrum of the issue—without
limitation of place. This is prohibited by the constitutional
requirements of article 15 Constitution even more so than by the
current statutory law.256

254. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 13 (Neth.); see also Kamerstukken II,
2016/17, 34 372, no. 6 at 24 (Neth.).
255. Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, n. 254865 (It.).
256. Cass. sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100 (It.).
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However, this judgment was overturned in 2016 by the Scurato
decision.257 The court observed that the requirement to specify in
advance the places where the interception was to take place was
not required in statutory law nor by ECHR case law. Further, the
Musumeci judgment had confused the term colloquially used for
oral
interception—namely
“environmental
interception”
(intercettazione ambientale), which historically assumes that oral
interception takes place in a particular environment in which a bug
is to be placed—with the term that the law actually uses—
interception of “communications between persons present.” The
first sentence of article 266(2) of the Italian CCP, which states that
communications between persons present can be intercepted in the
cases listed in article 266(1), does not contain a requirement to
specify the place for such interception. It is only in the second
sentence that protected places are mentioned, but this does not
constitute a requirement to specify the place of interception
beforehand as a condition of authorized interception. Rather, it
exists as a requirement to motivate why it is necessary to install a
bug in a protected place, for the purposes of specifying how oral
interception is to be executed. Such necessity is absent in the case
of interception through “informatic viruses,” which is, irrespective
of place and by its nature, a form of “itinerant” environmental
interception.258
The import of this, according to the United Sections of the
Supreme Court, is not that oral interception with Trojans in mobile
devices is allowed, as the Musumeci judgment suggested, when the
authorization order would describe ex ante the protected places in
which the interception was (expected) to take place (and the
motivation that crime takes place there). Rather, such use of a
Trojan is effectively not allowed at all because there are no
exceptions to the legislative requirement that oral interception can
only take place in places of private abode if there is motivated
reason to believe criminal activity takes place there. The judge
cannot foresee and predetermine in which places of private abode
the bugged portable device will be used, making it impossible

257. Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889 (It.).
258. Id. § 5.
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for the judge to effectively supervise that the legal requirement
be respected.259
There is, however, a major exception through a law from
1991,260 applicable in the Scurato case (and not considered in
Musumeci), which allows for interception under broader conditions
in investigations concerning organized crime or threat by
telephone. This law stipulates that in organized-crime
investigations, oral interception is allowed in protected places even
if there is no ground to believe that crimes are occurring in such
places. Therefore, in organized-crime investigations, an indication
of the places in which interception is to take place is irrelevant.261
The use of Trojans for oral interception is also the only
functionality of police hacking that the legislator has taken up and
is now regulated by statutory law. This suggests that the lawmaker
considers oral interception, particularly in constitutionally
protected places (homes and places of private abode), the most
intrusive usage of police hacking.262
Article 266(2) of the Italian CCP has been amended to the effect
that oral interception can also be effected “through the insertion of
an informatic sensor [captatore informatico] on a mobile electronic
device. However, if this occurs in the places indicated in article 614
Criminal Code, the interception is allowed only if there is
motivated reason to believe that the criminal activity is taking place
there.”263 For certain serious crimes,264 however, oral interception
through informatic sensors is always allowed, even in protected
places without indications of criminal activity.265 The decree
authorizing the hacking must mention the reasons that make this
measure necessary, as well as (if the crime is not a listed serious
259. Id. § 6.
260. See article 13 of Decreto Legge 13 maggio 1991, n. 152, G.U. Magg. 13, 1991, n. 110
(It.) on combatting organized crime.
261. Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889, § 7 (It.).
262. In doctrinal literature, however, it is emphasized that other functionalities can also
be very—equally or perhaps even more—intrusive. See supra text accompanying note 209.
263. Art. 266(2) C.p.p. (It.), as amended by Legge 29 dicembre 2017, n. 216 (effective
date postponed until March 2019). Art. 614 C.p. (It.) refers to the places protected by art. 14
Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (inviolability of the home), namely dwellings, places of private
abode, and appurtenances.
264. The crimes mentioned in Art. 51, ¶¶ 3-bis, 3-quater, C.p.p. (It.): briefly put,
conspiracy to, e.g., abduction, illegal immigration, or underage sex trafficking, and
terrorist crimes.
265. Art. 266-bis, ¶ 2-bis, C.p.p. (It.).
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crime) “the places and the time, also indirectly determined, in
relation to which the activation of the microphone is permitted.”266
These requirements suggest that the oral interception through
hacking will usually (or only) be possible if combined with other
investigation measures, such as visual observation or location
tracking, in order to determine the right moments in which to turn
the microphone on or off.
It should be noted that the statutory law only applies to hacking
mobile devices; hacking fixed devices (such as desktop computers)
for the purposes of oral interception therefore falls under the
regime previously determined in case law—in particular the
Scurato judgment. Consequently, the legal goods considered to be
most at issue in this stream of law are the secrecy of
communications (particularly communications between people
present,
which
are
more
strongly
protected
than
telecommunications in this context) and the inviolability of the
home. The latter receives particular emphasis in the fine-grained
patchwork of situations in which law enforcement is allowed to
conduct oral interception in protected places (dwellings and places
of private abode), primarily through a requirement that
conversations in these places can only be intercepted if there are
grounds to believe that criminal activity is taking place there. Only
for certain designated crimes does this limitation not apply. This
suggests that the home is, in this context, particularly seen as a
place where people should be able to freely converse and speak
their minds.
In Germany, the functionality of oral interception does not
appear to be permissible. The online search is limited to collection
of data; using the infiltrated computer system for the independent
generation of data is inadmissible. Therefore, an independent
activation of the microphone is not allowed. This can be deduced
from the wording of section 100b of the German CCP, as well as its
title (search).267 Furthermore, the literature questions the
permissibility of using incidental oral interception, for example
when the connected microphone intercepts conversations without
being activated by law enforcement. Such interception could meet
the conditions of acoustic surveillance of the home (subject to the

266. Art. 267(1) C.p.p. (It.).
267. Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 172; Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
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same requirements as the online search), but since the order for
such measure would not exist in case of incidental interception, it
will usually not be usable.268
E. Observation
Observation encompasses turning on a webcam (or another
camera) to identify the user or location of a device or to observe
behavior of the user or people in their environment. In the United
States, multiple federal appellate courts have held that the
heightened “super-warrant” requirements outlined in the Wiretap
Act apply to video surveillance269 (although these requirements
technically apply by virtue of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Berger v. New York270 rather than as a direct application of the
Wiretap Act itself271). Thus, in In re Warrant to Search a Target
Computer at Premises Unknown, the federal magistrate judge
borrowed the Wiretap Act’s heightened standard to reject a warrant
application from the government covering the remote activation of
the target computer’s webcam.272 In that application, the
government sought to get around the “super-warrant”
requirements by claiming that they only intended to “snap
photographs sufficient to identify the persons using the computer,”
a form of surveillance they described as “photo monitoring, as
opposed to video surveillance”273 (meaning they would not acquire
the contents of any oral, wire, or electronic communications).

268. Graf, supra note 37, Rn. 55.
269. See United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 416–20 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v.
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538–42 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d
1433, 1436–46 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir.
1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510–11 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres,
751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984); see also In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759–60 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (applying Title III wiretap standards
for warrant applications to a request for video surveillance).
270. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58–60 (1967).
271. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 639–40 (“The unanimous conclusion among federal
appellate courts has been that the Wiretap Act does not apply, but the Berger doctrine does.
Courts must, consequently, borrow the core super-warrant protections from the Wiretap Act
when authorizing video surveillance. The result for law enforcement malware is clear
guidance: if agents seek to enable a computer’s camera, they must obtain a super-warrant
in advance.”).
272. In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
759–60.
273. Id. at 759.
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However, the magistrate found that, “this [wa]s a distinction
without a difference. In between snapping photographs, the
Government w[ould] have [had] real time access to the camera’s
video feed. That access amount[ed] to video surveillance.”274
In the Netherlands, systematic observation, where the remote
access facilitates observation, is regulated in article 126g of the
Dutch CCP. In contrast to the regular power for systematic
observation, a technical device (i.e., the software used to infect the
target’s smartphone) may be placed on a person without their
consent. An example would be a secretly installed GPS tracker that
maps the smartphone’s movements with high accuracy.275
It is relevant to note that the current prohibition of “permanent”
visual observation in the home remains in place. Since article
126nba(1)(c) of the Dutch CCP refers to using hacking for the
purpose of conducting systematic observation as regulated in
article 126g, the latter’s legal conditions also apply, which include
prohibition of in-home recordings by installed cameras.276 Thus,
“permanent observation of what happens inside a dwelling through
remotely turning on the webcam of, for instance, a smartphone or
laptop, must be considered equally intrusive as entering a
dwelling; that is not allowed in the context of criminal
investigation.”277 As before, the lawmaker here leaves open some
form of incidental observation inside the dwelling from the outside:
the prohibition explicitly sees to “permanent” recordings, which
likely refers to indiscriminate recording of everything over a certain
period of time. The recording of webcam images for a short period
might be allowed. Possibly, the real-time watching of webcam
images—without recording them—might also be allowed if this is
done with a view to start recording webcam footage when
something happens that is relevant for the investigation (and
stopping the recording as soon as the investigation-related activity
ends). Such real-time observation might be compared with a police
officer hiding in the bushes and taking snapshots of relevant inhome activities, which is allowed.278 In any case, using the webcam

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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for covertly making in-home recordings over a period of time is
not allowed.
In Italy, the norms for video recordings (using spyware to turn
on the computer’s or phone’s camera) apply according to the
Musumeci case.279 Briefly put, such use of Trojans is allowed as an
atypical means of searching for evidence as long as visual
recordings are made in public places or places exposed to the public
and not in places of private abode or in situations where personal
privacy needs to be protected (such as public toilets). Visual
recordings made in the latter cases have to be excluded from
evidence.280 Therefore, since visual recordings inside protected
places are not allowed at all, it can arguably be concluded that,
despite the Musumeci case, visual observation through Trojans in
mobile devices is not allowed since it may not be possible to
determine in advance that they are not located in a protected place.
Therefore, law enforcement may only infect with malware
fixed computers in public or publicly accessible places to turn on
a webcam.
In Germany, although some authors mention visual
observation as one of the possibilities enabled by police hacking,281
most of the literature rejects this view.282 As previously discussed
with regard to oral interception, German online search provisions
only allow collection of data but not their active generation by, for
example, activating the webcam. Even when the camera is
activated by the users themselves, this would be quite problematic.
If the user is inside a dwelling, this active generation of data would
constitute visual surveillance of living space, which is invariably
unacceptable under the German Basic Law.283 The potential use of
this functionality would therefore have to be limited to incidental
cases, such as when the user turns on their camera in a public place.
Although the functionality of turning on a computer’s webcam
is minimally discussed in the context of police hacking, the general
prohibition of visual observation inside the home in several
jurisdictions (Germany, Italy, Netherlands) suggests an additional
279. Cass. sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100, § 3.
280. Id.
281. Beukelmann, supra note 21, at 440.
282. Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 172; Roggan, supra note 53, at 826; Singelnstein &
Derin, supra note 48, at 2647.
283. Roggan, supra note 53, at 826.
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emphasis on protection of the home as a shelter for behavioral
freedom: people should not feel inhibited to do what they want
with fear of being observed in the security of their home. The fact
that visual observation is prohibited, while oral interception is
allowed (albeit under strict conditions), might suggest that
behavioral freedom is valued even more highly than the freedom
to speak one’s mind inside the home. However, this legal
constellation might also be explained by the generally higher
relevance of interception for criminal investigation purposes over
visual observation, so that the balance of interests weighs
somewhat more towards criminal investigation in the case of inhome interception, while weighing more towards privacy in the
case of in-home observation.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this Article, we are particularly interested in the way in
which lawmakers and courts assess the intrusiveness of police
hacking given that this multifunctional new power can impact a
wide variety of interests and rights. A computer, alone or in
combination with cloud storage, is a functional equivalent of many
traditional spaces in which social life is enacted (such as living
rooms, bedrooms, cafés, libraries, hospital rooms, and public
squares), and essentially collapses these into a single complex
digital environment.284 This makes police hacking a power that
potentially intrudes upon various privacy interests in a manner and
degree that may resemble traditional offline investigation to greater
or lesser extents, depending on the functionalities and applications.
We are particularly interested in examining whether lawmakers
and courts rely on traditional privacy frameworks in regulating
police hacking or, alternatively, whether they resort to new privacy
frames in order to determine its intrusiveness. In this Part, we first
summarize the classic privacy frameworks that emerged in our
analysis, and we then focus on new privacy frames that emerge in
the regulation of police hacking.

284. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Privacy Spaces, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 635 (2018).
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A. Classic Privacy Frames
During our comparative research, we identified two classic
privacy frames which are relevant in all five jurisdictions to some
extent: the inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications.
Additionally, protection of personal data is a classic framework in
Italy and Germany, as is protection of a core of privacy in Germany.
It is also worth mentioning that certain privileged information,
related, for instance, to legal privilege or the protection of
journalistic sources, enjoys special protection in most jurisdictions,
although it is often not regulated specifically in the context of
police hacking.285
1. Inviolability of the home
In the continental jurisdictions (and in the United States286),
constitutional protection of the inviolability of the home forms a
key traditional form of privacy protection. The protection is given
to a spatially delimited sphere which is under control of the
individual and which can only be intruded upon in a limited set of
circumstances in which relatively high safeguards have to be met,
typically requiring a judicial order. It offers container-type
protection not protecting private life directly but protecting this
physical space as a proxy for where private life is presumed to
take place.
The limitations of such a form of protection to effectively
protect computers are apparent. One reason is that current
computers (understood broadly) are not necessarily always kept at
home and are commonly carried by their users wherever they go.
Additionally, even computers that typically remain physically
inside the home are interconnected with other computers. Data are
also increasingly stored remotely, which makes data susceptible to
being collected either in transit or at the place of remote storage
(where protections based on traditional notions of “home” will not
285. Protecting privileged information plays an important role in police hacking
regulation in the UK. See supra Section III(D).
286. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[T]he interior of homes [are]
the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy[.]”); United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed[.]”). But see supra
text accompanying note 169 (advisory committee finding that “computers are no more
sacrosanct than homes”).
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typically apply287). The significance of this limitation is moderated
to some extent in the United States by a similar focus on protecting
privacy (by proxy) through the protection of closed containers and
the application of this doctrine to computers.288 But this does not
apply to the European jurisdictions in our study.
Therefore, even though commitments to and theories of the
inviolability of the home potentially offer robust protection for
private life, our research reveals that its relevance in relation to
police hacking activities is limited and partial. We can distinguish
between two principal types of police hacking activities when it
comes to the importance of home protection: 1) measures using
covert access to a computer as a tool to monitor behavior in the
physical space in which it is located and 2) measures targeting the
computer itself in order to access stored data. The role of home
protection appears to remain very strong in the first type of police
hacking, where the police hacking does not target the computer
itself but rather the physical environment by, for example, turning
on the microphone or the webcam. The inviolability of the home
remains the main constitutional standard in relation to these
functionalities. In the United States, the Fourth Amendment clearly
covers this form of covert surveillance.289
Dutch regulation of the functionality of oral interception has
been justified by the fact that it avoids the need to physically enter
the home.290 In Italy, communications taking place in homes and
places of private abode can only be monitored if there is motivated
287. This is particularly evident in the provisions of the Stored Communications Act in
the U.S., which provides a very different (and less restrictive) regulatory regime for access to
stored communications-related data than, for example, a search of a person’s house for
communication-related evidence, a search of a smartphone, or the wiretapping of
communications occurring within a person’s place of residence.
288. See supra references and text accompanying note 131.
289. Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Karo, the Fourth
Amendment’s protections for the privacy of the home apply to the mere use of tracking
technology to determine “whether a particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an
individual’s home at a particular time[,]” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984),
something the Court noted would “reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises
that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise
obtained without a warrant.” Id. at 715; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“[O]btaining by senseenhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area’ constitutes a search[.]”) (internal citations omitted).
290. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 13 (Neth.); see also Kamerstukken II,
2016/17, 34 372, no. 6 at 24 (Neth.).
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reason to believe criminal activity is taking place there. Since
criminal activity cannot be foreseen beforehand and effective
judicial supervision would be impossible, police hacking for this
purpose is generally not allowed under existing case law.291 The
forthcoming statutory regulation of police hacking into mobile
devices for the purpose of oral interception also suggests that oral
interception in constitutionally protected places (homes and
places of private abode) is considered the most intrusive form of
police hacking.292
In German doctrine we also found considerations for the
protection of the home being used as an argument against the
possibility of using police hacking for oral interceptions.293 The
U.K. legislation makes no specific provision for the monitoring
of activity in the home. However, the extent to which equipment
interference reveals such activity will be considered under
the proportionality assessment by the authority issuing an
interference warrant.
The protection of the home features even more strongly in case
of visual observation. In the Netherlands, permanent visual
observation in the home is generally prohibited, which applies also
to police hacking.294 Similarly, in Italy, use of Trojans to make visual
recordings of public places is allowed, but monitoring places of
private abode or in situations where personal privacy needs to be
protected is not permitted.295 Visual surveillance of dwellings is
also not permitted under German Basic Law in the criminal
procedure context.296 In the United States, heightened warrant
standards would apply to video surveillance inside the home.297
In contrast, when either data stored on a computer or a user’s
computer behavior is the target of the investigation (functionalities
B and C), constitutional home protection appears to be less relevant
as the standard of protection. An exception is Italy, where case law
suggests that, in cases of remote access, computers located inside

291. Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889, § 6 (It.).
292. Decreto Legislativo 29 dicembre 2017, n.216, G.U. Jan. 11, 2018, n.8 (It.) (the entry
into effect of which, as observed, was postponed to March 2019); Art. 266, ¶ 2, C.p.p. (It.).
293. Graf, supra note 37, Rn. 55.
294. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 27 (Neth.) (emphasis added).
295. Cass. sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100, § 3 (It.).
296. Roggan, supra note 53, at 826.
297. See supra Section IV(E).
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the home should be protected more strongly than computers
located elsewhere, such as in public offices that can be accessed
by a larger number of people.298 However, this has been
criticized in the literature as misunderstanding the intrinsic placeindependence of computers. Italian authors therefore point to
different legal goods, such as “informatic home” or “informatic
privacy,” as the proper yardstick, instead of traditional
home protection.299
Explicit place-based distinctions are not found in the German,
Dutch, U.K., or U.S. regulation of remote computer searches. Dutch,
U.K., and U.S. safeguards for this form of police hacking are equally
high regardless of the location of the computer (although, in
practice, U.S. judges might choose, at their discretion, to apply
stricter rules for searches conducted within homes than for searches
conducted in less privacy-sensitive places). The U.K. approach is
illustrative in that its statutory scheme regulating equipment
interference corresponds with the place-independent criminal
offense of hacking, which criminalizes unauthorized access to a
computer, or any data stored on it, regardless of its place.
Computers thus appear to be worthy of protection themselves
and are protected through very high safeguards, thus making home
protection irrelevant.300
German provisions on the online search also make no mention
of home protection. The applicability of home protection to police
hacking has been examined at some length by the German
Constitutional Court, identifying significant loopholes in the
protection offered to computers.301 According to the Constitutional
Court, the protection of the home applies to both physical
penetration of the dwelling and to measures by which the state
agencies obtain an impression of events within the dwelling that
298. Trogu, supra note 195, at 448 (quoting cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556 (It.)).
299. See supra Section IV(B) and infra Sections V(B)(1)–(2).
300. See supra Section III(B). Analogies to the constitutional protection of the home are
found, however, quite often in judicial decisions related to the regulation of police searches
of digital devices. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“[A] cell phone
search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search
of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously
found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a
home in any form—unless the phone is.”).
301. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 191 (Ger.), http://www.bverfg.de/
e/rs20080227_1bvr037007en.html.
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are removed from natural perception.302 Thus, police hacking to
monitor events in the dwelling by using peripherals of the system
are covered by the constitutional home protection.303 We see the
same result in the United States.304 However, constitutional
protection of the home in Germany
does not . . . confer on the individual any across-the-board
protection regardless of the access modalities against the
infiltration of his or her information technology system, even if
this system is located in a dwelling. The encroachment may take
place regardless of location, so that space-oriented protection is
unable to avert the specific endangerment of the information
technology system. Insofar as the infiltration uses the connection
of the computer concerned to form a computer network, it leaves
spatial privacy provided by delimitation of the dwelling
unaffected. The location of the system is in many cases of no
interest for the investigation measure, and frequently will not be
recognizable even for the authority.305

The latter is an important point for consideration by
jurisdictions that stick to place-based protection: laws that allow
police hacking outside the home but not inside the home for certain
functionalities will be difficult to enforce in practice, due to the
place-independence of modern computing devices. From the
legislative documents we studied, in jurisdictions that (for some
functionality, such as oral interception or visual observation) apply
a place-based distinction, the law provides very little guidance to
police as to how they should determine when the hacking takes
place inside or outside a home (indeed, knowing the location might
reasonably necessitate some form of a priori police hacking, à la
functionality A). The most meaningful way to operationalize a
place-based distinction is to distinguish between fixed computers
(where non-home-based fixed computers might be hacked under
lower conditions than in-home fixed computers) and mobile
computers (where the practical difficulties of determining their
actual location would imply that mobile computers should not be
hackable, if home protection is to be respected).

302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. Rn. 192.
Id. Rn. 193.
See discussion supra note 287.
BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Rn. 194.
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However, as ever more people are using mobile computers
rather than fixed desktop computers, it will make less sense to base
protection on computers’ locations. This is where the German
approach is innovative and seems prescient: it determines the
intrusiveness of covert online searches not through the lens of home
protection (even if a hacked computer would happen to be inside a
home),306 but solely through the lens of the new standard of the
confidentiality and integrity of computers.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that even though the
protection of the home does not appear to be a relevant standard of
protection in cases of covert remote searches in Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United States (to a great extent, excepting sua
sponte judicial determinations when reviewing warrant
applications), it does appear to have served as a role model for the
level of procedural safeguards that should be put in place. Because
the German Constitutional Court considers secret infiltration of
computer systems to be comparably intrusive to acoustic
surveillance of the home, the legislator designed the procedural
safeguards for the two measures identically.307 The same is true for
the Dutch statutory regulation, where oral interception in the
dwelling and remote computer searches are arguably considered
equally intrusive by the lawmaker.308
2. Secrecy of communications
Most contemporary computers serve, at least in part, as
communication devices. Computers that can be the target of remote
police hacking must be in some way connected to other devices
and, thus, capable of communication. Mobile phones, the most
commonly used type of personal computing device (at least in the
United States309), originated primarily as communication devices,
but have assumed additional computing functions over time.
In the United States, at least at the federal level, the privacy of
communications is protected under a variety of statutory regimes,
306. Id. Rn. 195.
307. Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171.
308. See supra Section IV(B).
309. According to the Pew Research Center, 95% of Americans own some type of
cellphone (with smartphone ownership at 77%), while 73% own a laptop or desktop
computer and only 53% own a tablet computer (as of January 10, 2018). Mobile Fact Sheet,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/.
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with varying levels of protection based on 1) whether police seek
the content of a communication or only related non-content
information (metadata); and 2) for searches related to the content of
communications, whether police seek to intercept the
communication in transit (wire and electronic communication),
contemporaneously with oral utterance (oral communication), or
after evidence of the communication has been saved to electronic
storage. Contemporaneous (or nearly contemporaneous310) wire,
oral, and electronic communication is protected against unlawful
interception by the heightened authorization requirements
contained within the Wiretap Act, while police access to
electronically stored communications information is subject to the
requirements of either Rule 41 or the Stored Communications Act
(depending on the nature of the proposed search).311
In most continental European jurisdictions, the constitutional
protection of the secrecy of communications traditionally protects
only mediated communications, such as letters, phone calls, or
various electronic communications. Since it only protects
information in transit, it essentially protects the communication
channel itself from interference (interception) or, more precisely, it
protects the trust of communicating parties in the confidentiality of
the communication channel.312 Such protection is supposed to avert
the dangers of spatially distanced communication.313 Thus, the
standard of secrecy of communications should normally not apply
to police hacking activities. Because these activities target the
terminal device itself rather than the communications channel, they
concern the trust of users in the integrity of their terminal
equipment and not in the communication channel.314
However, we observe a departure from the traditional framing
of secrecy of communications, especially in German law. The
German Constitutional Court recognizes that the constitutional
310. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 640 n.276 (citing Williams v. Stoddard, No. PC 12-3664,
2015 WL 644200, at *19–30 (R.I. Super. Feb. 11, 2015)) (“Courts have generally not required
that the transmission of recorded activity be precisely contemporaneous with the activity.”).
311. See supra Section IV(D)(1).
312. Italian law is an exception here, since art. 15 Cost. protects the secrecy “of
correspondence and of any other form of communications,” which includes non-mediated
(i.e., oral) conversations. Filippo Donati, Commento all’art. 15, in COMMENTARIO ALLA
COSTITUZIONE § 2.2 (Raffaele Bifulco, Alfonso Celotto & Marco Olivetti eds., Utet 2006).
313. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 185. (Ger.)
314. Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 20.
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guarantee of the secrecy of telecommunication protects the nonphysical transmission of information to individual recipients,
regardless of the method of transmission, but does not protect the
confidentiality and integrity of computer systems.315 Yet, the Court
stated that
insofar as an empowerment is restricted to a state measure by
means of which the contents and circumstances of the ongoing
telecommunication are collected in the computer network, or the
data related thereto is evaluated, the encroachment is to be
measured against Article 10.1 of the Basic Law [(secrecy of
communications)] alone. The scope of protection of this
fundamental right is affected here regardless of whether in
technical terms the measure targets the transmission channel or
the terminal used for telecommunication.316

The protection of secrecy of communications, however, only
applies to communications in transit; it does not apply to stored
communications, nor to stored (non-communicative) data that are
in transit (e.g., access by users to their own data in the cloud).317
Thus, according to the Constitutional Court, the so-called source
telecommunications surveillance (functionality D.1) is to be solely
measured against the standard of constitutional protection of
secrecy of communications. This implies that access to such
communications is allowed under less strict safeguards than an
online search (functionality B), as long as it can be technically
ensured that access to non-communications data is precluded.318
In Italy, the secrecy of communications has not been found at
issue by the Supreme Court when the program does not intercept a
flow of communications (which implies a dialogue with other
persons), but merely targets the unidirectional flow of data inside
the computer’s circuits.319 In the United Kingdom, the interception
of communications and the acquisition of communications data
stored on a computer or other device are covered by separate
regulatory regimes; still, they afford similar levels of protection to

315. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Rn. 182-183.
316. Id. Rn. 184.
317. Id. Rn. 185-186.
318. Id. Rn. 190.
319. Trogu, supra note 195, at 448 (referring to Cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556
(“Virruso”) (It.)).
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comply with the right to private life under Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
3. Data protection
Protection of personal data, as used in this section, refers to a
variety of content-based approaches of privacy protection in our
jurisdictions. As opposed to the protection of the home (which
protects the physical place as a container) and the secrecy of
communications (which traditionally protects the communication
channel), data protection aims to protect personal data itself as
something worthy of distinct protection.
In Germany, this content-based protection is expressed as the
standard of informational self-determination, which is one
manifestation of the general right of personality protected in Article
2 of the German Constitution.320 This manifestation of privacy
protection confers on the individual, in principle, the power to
determine for themselves the disclosure and use of their personal
data.321 As with protections for home and communication, the
Constitutional Court finds that informational self-determination
offers insufficient protection to computer users. The Court
finds that
[t]he need for protection of the user of an information technology
system is however not solely restricted to data to be allotted to his
or her privacy. Such an attribution also frequently depends on the
context in which the data came about and into which it is brought
by linking with other data. In many cases, the data itself does not
reveal what significance it has for the person concerned and
which it may gain by inclusion in other contexts.322

A similar argument is advanced in the Italian debate, where
Iovene determined that article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights (the right to privacy), rather than article 8 (the right to data
protection), is relevant for protecting informatic privacy:
At issue is not so much guaranteeing to the affected person the
control of the ways in which his personal data are processed;
rather, more fundamentally, protecting the person in a context in

320. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 Rn. 196.
321. Id. Rn. 198.
322. Id. Rn. 197.

1067

003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/17/20 12:39 PM

2019

which the most varied aspects of his private life are translated into
data, which are susceptible to informatic processing. In an
environment in which it is no longer possible to distinguish
between intimate, reserved, and social data, article 8 of the EU
Charter turns out to be inapplicable and one should turn to the
wide protection offered by article 7 to protect private life.323

In other jurisdictions, we have not encountered the application
of a data-protection-oriented lens in discussions of police hacking.
Thus, we conclude that lawmakers and courts do not consider the
protection of personal data to be a significant normative framework
by which to evaluate the intrusiveness of police hacking, even
if personal data are constitutionally protected (e.g., in the
EU Charter).
4. Core of Privacy
An additional privacy frame noted in Germany that does not
appear to have a comparable analogy in the other jurisdictions we
examined is the protection of an inviolable core area of private life.
In its 2016 ruling on the law regulating police hacking in the
preventive sphere,324 the Constitutional Court paid careful
attention to the law’s conformity with the protection of the core
area and eventually declared its provisions unconstitutional.
Therefore, this privacy frame merits a brief analysis since the Court
made interesting observations regarding the way the core area
should be protected when undertaking police hacking.
The constitutional protection of the core area guarantees a
highly private sphere that is free from surveillance in order to
protect human dignity; this sphere consists of inner processes, such
as impressions and feelings, as well as reflections, views, and
experiences of a highly personal nature.325 The police are never
allowed to target this core area of private life. Additionally, the
protection of the core area must be taken into account on two levels:
the data collection level, where arrangements must be made to
exclude unintentional collection as much as possible, and the level
of subsequent analysis and use of information, where the intrusion

323. Iovene, supra note 24, at 338.
324. BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, Apr. 20, 2016 (Ger.).
325. Id. Rn. 120-121.
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into the core area must be strictly minimized.326 Given that covert
access to computer systems typically carries the risk that
investigators will collect highly confidential data, the second level
of protection must be given particular attention. This contrasts with
surveillance of the home, a difference which the Constitutional
Court expressed by referring to the specific nature of computer
systems, where
protective measures to prevent violations of the core area do not
aim primarily at preventing the collection and recording of a
fleeting, highly confidential moment in a private space, but rather
at preventing the reading of highly confidential information
within a comprehensive data set of digital information that
already exists, and that, taken as a whole, is typically not of a
private nature the way behaviour or communication in a home
would be. Here, the surveillance does not take place in the form
of a chronologically ordered occurrence in different locations, but
rather as access by means of a spy program which, as far as
the access is concerned, presents only the alternatives of all
or nothing.327

As data relevant to the core area cannot be adequately excluded
during data collection, safeguards must be put in place at the levels
of analysis and use, such as using an independent examiner to
screen the information and filter out information relevant to the
core area prior to making the information available to the
investigating law enforcement authority.328
B. New Privacy Frames
As the previous discussion shows, jurisdictions resort to classic
privacy frames (in particular, the home and secrecy of
communications), but the adequacy of these frames in assessing the
intrusiveness of police hacking is limited to certain functionalities
(such as visual observation and interception). In an era where
computers contain so much information that a search of a person’s
computer could reveal significantly more than a search of a
person’s home,329 new privacy frames may be needed to assess the
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. Rn. 216-217.
Id. Rn. 218 .
Id. Rn. 220.
See supra note 294.
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intrusiveness of police hacking. Across the jurisdictions, we
observe the contours of two such new frames emerging: a
container-based approach focusing on the computer as protectionworthy in itself and a content-based approach focusing on the data.
1. Inviolability of the computer
Since the traditional privacy frames of home, communications,
and data protection seem no longer sufficient to protect the privacy
of computer users in the context of police hacking, some
jurisdictions have taken a new approach: recognizing, explicitly or
implicitly, that computers are protection-worthy in themselves.
Thus, a new form of container-based protection, in which the
computer serves as a proxy for protected privacy values, is
emerging in several legal systems.
Importantly, the property-based approach to constitutional
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment has long
regarded “closed containers” as worthy of some protection. In
more recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the police
may engage in a Fourth Amendment search when they merely
touch a suspect’s physical property (including a computer),
analogizing these physical “closed container” searches to those
conducted of electronic devices.330 As such, this line of
reasoning continues the long-running U.S. approach to protecting
privacy through proxies (often relying on notions of real or
personal property).
In Germany, the Constitutional Court found, as early as 2008,
that the existing constitutional safeguards protecting the
inviolability of the home, the secrecy of communications, and
informational self-determination were not sufficient to protect
individuals against secret infiltration of their computers. The Court
recognized that the use of computers, their omnipresence and
centrality in the lives of individuals, and the significance they hold
for developing individual personalities provides individuals with

330. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that that the physical placement of a GPS tracking device under
an automobile’s rear bumper constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, at least
insofar it as was connected to collecting information about the location of the vehicle,
as “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information”).
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many new opportunities, but also presents previously unforeseen
dangers.331 Consequently,
a large amount of data can be accessed in the working memory
and on the storage media of such systems relating to the personal
circumstances, social contacts and activities of the user. If this data
is collected and evaluated by third parties, this can be highly
illuminating as to the personality of the user, and may even make
it possible to form a [personality] profile.332

In response, the Court interpreted the articles of the
Constitution protecting human dignity and the free development
of personality as encompassing a fundamental right to the
guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information
technology systems.333 This right protects against encroachments to
computers insofar as protection is not guaranteed by other
fundamental rights.334 This fundamental right is not absolute and
encroachments may be justified for both preventive and criminal
prosecution purposes, but these encroachments must meet very
high standards in terms of both the conditions for their
authorization and other procedural safeguards.335
Although not as explicit as in Germany, the Dutch regulation
also seems to find computers as highly protection-worthy in
themselves within the context of police hacking, since the
preconditions for covert remote searches are among the strictest in
the criminal procedure system. These regulations are on par with
the requirements set for acoustic surveillance inside private
dwellings. Both Germany and the Netherlands therefore
recognize a form of sui generis protection of computers in the
context of police hacking.336
In Italian law, computer systems are more broadly recognized
as protection-worthy in themselves, in an attempt to make a
conceptual connection between the home as a physical space and a
computer or cyberspace as an informatic equivalent of the home,
331. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 170-171 (Ger.).
332. Id. Rn. 178.
333. Id. Rn. 166.
334. Id. Rn. 167.
335. Id. Rn. 207.
336. Such protection of computers (at least in the manifestation of cell-phones) has also
been recognized in U.S. law, but in a different context, namely search of smartphones
incident to arrest. See supra note 293.
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which is a legal good recognized in the law on the offense of
hacking.337 The informatic home needs to be protected
as the virtual space (but also physical space in which the
informatic data are contained) relating to the individual sphere,
which is also constitutionally protected, over which the owner can
exercise towards third persons both the jus prohibendi and the jus
admittendi, with a legitimate expectation of privacy.338

Torre observes that the concept of the “informatic home” has
been recognized by the lawmaker as a virtual extension of the
physical home protection under article 14 of the Italian
Constitution. This has also been confirmed by the Italian
Supreme Court:339
[Although] a notion of home disconnected to spatio-temporal
coordinates was inconceivable at the time the Constitution was
drafted, the rationale of the norm of article 14 should today direct
us not only to protect the physical home, but also and ever more
towards defending those virtual spaces that represent, by now, a
fundamental conjugation of the individual’s life.340

Importantly, Torre argues that the informatic home is even
more personal and intimate than the traditional home, since the
latter may contain documents or personal effects, but
the informatic home, be it a depository of the individual’s work
activities or of his private life, preserves an extension of our mind
itself, because the user, ‘working’ with the machine, and inserting
his own information into it, entrusts to it his work and/or private
plans, his thoughts, his projects (past, present or future): all those
data represent traces and expressions of our daily life and of our
personality; hence, from this perspective, the necessity to protect
the privacy of the informatic home would prove even more
relevant and important than the physical home itself, going
beyond the mere aspect of protecting the privacy of the places of

337. See supra text accompanying note 216.
338. Trogu, supra note 195, at 434 (citing Cass., Pen. VI, 4 ottobre 1999, n. 3067, CED
Cass (It.)).
339. Torre, supra note 14, at 85 (quoting Cass. Pen. V, 26 ottobre 2012, n. 42021).
340. Id. at 85–86.
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a person’s life, and embracing the protection of the individual’s
personality itself.341

According to Iovene, it is now necessary to “reaffirm the
existence of that sphere of privacy, whose classic boundaries,
linked to the physical spaces and to the type of information that one
wants to keep others from knowing, are blurring and
dissolving.”342 This can be done by recognizing a new legal good,
worthy of constitutional protection. While the “informatic home”
seems a good candidate, it is not sufficiently precise since the home
serves the interest of the jus excludendi alios (the right to exclude
others) from a preeminently personal or intimate sphere while
computer systems involve a broader range of activities in which
people express their personalities and develop social relations
online or in other “informatic” spaces.343 The concept of
informatic privacy, which Iovene proposes, will be discussed in the
following section.
2. Informatic privacy and the mosaic theory
In the previous section, we discussed new approaches to
protecting individuals in the context of covert access to their
computer. These new approaches attempt to do so by protecting
the computers or a metaphorical informatic home, as a proxy for
the values the approaches mean to protect. At the same time, and
often interconnected with the first approach, we observe a
second approach, which attempts to protect content itself rather
than the container, as a proxy for the values both approaches mean
to safeguard.
In Italian doctrine, the idea of protection-worthy content is
expressed as informatic privacy (riservatezza informatica). The
concept is in a way a critique of the informatic home concept. It
stresses that computer systems involve a broader range of activities
in which people express their personalities and develop social
relations online or in other “informatic” spaces.344 In other words,
since informatic systems collapse the personal and the social
341. Id. at 86 (quoting GIORGIO PICA, DIRITTO PENALE DELLE TECNOLOGIE INFORMATICHE
66 (1999)).
342. Iovene, supra note 24, at 335.
343. Id.; see also Flor, supra note 47.
344. Iovene, supra note 24, at 335-336.
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spheres of life, the interest at stake is not so much in protection of
an informatic “home” so as to enable greater control in the access
to information, but it is in protection of informatic privacy so as to
enable controlling what happens with information. Thus, part of
the Italian doctrine emphasizes that “informatic privacy” is the
legal good to be protected and can be described as the “exclusive
interest, legally recognized, to enjoy, dispose, and control the
digitized information, processes, systems and ‘spaces’, and their
uses.”345 The focus on what happens with the information—as
opposed to merely controlling the access to it—is also reflected
by the German Constitutional Court in the context of core
area protection.346
Some Italian authors reach beyond informatic privacy and
resort to human dignity as the ultimate normative frame to apply
to police hacking. Torre argues that the computer can now function
as an actual “appendix” of the person and their most fundamental
self. With such an understanding, police hacking touches upon the
inviolability of the mind and thereby triggers considerations of
human dignity. After all, through real-time monitoring of
computer use, police hacking implies that police can not only
acquire finished or stored documents but also expressions that
people type but may rethink and erase before storing in some
durable form. Thus, police hacking enables an unprecedented
perception of people’s thoughts.347 Therefore, it seems that Torre
ultimately considers human dignity to be the core legal good at
issue and recommends treating this as a constitutional right
associated with proper constitutional safeguards. However, his
argument remains somewhat ambiguous as he subsequently jumps
from human dignity to “informatic privacy” as the legal good at
issue in the regulation of police hacking. This may be the case
because Torre considers this to be more realistically achievable as a
constitutionally protected right.
345. Iovene, supra note 24, at 335 (quoting Flor, supra note 227).
346. See supra Section III(A).
347. Torre, supra note 14, at 87. Similarly, Torre, supra note 201, at 28 observes that the
“inviolability of the mind” (inviolabilità della psiche) is infringed, if the Trojan captures
whatever the investigated person writes, also if he decides to immediately delete what he
has just written. Palmieri also emphasizes that the use of Trojans “borders on controlling the
mind,” touching upon “opinions and thoughts” rather than “actions and behaviours.”
Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60–61 (citing TONINI & CONTI, supra note 225, at 482; Gaito &
Furfaro, supra note 225, at 364).
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The German protection of the confidentiality and integrity of
computer systems348 also contains elements of the content type of
protection. This computer-focused protection is based on the
observation that computers process a wide variety of data,
which together can tell a lot about someone without individual
pieces of data necessarily being privacy-relevant. The Court argued
as follows:
In many cases, the data itself does not reveal what significance it
has for the person concerned and which it may gain by inclusion
in other contexts. The consequence of this is that, inevitably, not
only private data is collected by the infiltration of the system, but
access to all data is facilitated, so that a comprehensive picture of
the user of the system may emerge.349

The notion that computers may contain so many and such
varied data that computer searches can result in highly intrusive
pictures of people’s private lives leads to an important limitation in
the scope of the new right to integrity and confidentiality of
computers. According to the Constitutional Court,
not all information technology systems which are able to create,
process or store personal data require the special protection of a
separate guarantee of personality rights. Insofar as such a system
by its technical construction only contains data with a partial
connection to a certain area of life of the person concerned—for
instance non-networked electronic control systems in household
appliances—, [sic] state access to the existing data is no different
in qualitative terms than other data collections. In such a case, the
protection of the right to informational self-determination is
sufficient to guarantee the justified interests of the person
concerned in confidentiality.
The fundamental right to the guarantee of the integrity and
confidentiality of information technology systems is to be applied,
by contrast, if the empowerment to encroach covers systems
which alone or in their technical networking can contain personal
data of the person concerned to such a degree and in such a
diversity that access to the system facilitates insight into

348. See supra Section V(B)(1).
349. BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 197 (Ger.).
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significant parts of the life of a person or indeed provides a
revealing picture of the personality.350

The Court here recognizes a special status of computers, which
deserve to be protected not necessarily because they contain bits of
very intimate data, such as those protected by the core area of
private life, but because they process a large quantity and diversity
of data relating to many spheres of life of the user. Even if the
individual bits of information are not in themselves very revealing,
putting them together might provide a revealing image of a
person’s personality and thus constitute a significant intrusion.
The German Court therefore seems to implicitly recognize a
mosaic framework resembling the considerations that led to the
formulation of the so-called mosaic theory in the United States. The
basic idea of the mosaic theory, particularly in the criminal
procedure context, is that the aggregation of numerous individual
data points about a person can, in their composite, reveal
substantially more about a person than any of the individual pieces
of data can on their own. The (potential) application of the mosaic
theory to the regulation of police investigatory conduct in the
United States has provoked quite a significant response from legal
scholars in recent years,351 including a number of critical
responses.352 The theory has, thus far, been influential in some
recent Supreme Court decisions, most notably United States v. Jones,
in which Justice Sotomayor expressed concern about the
implications of police use of GPS tracking technologies: “GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”353
Additionally, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan, made a similar argument, namely, that the duration of
surveillance (data collection) and amount of data collected would

350. Id. Rn. 202-203.
351. E.g., David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 402–11
(2013); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,
12–13 (2012).
352. E.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
315 (2012) (“[A]s a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory.”).
353. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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ultimately implicate constitutional privacy concerns, even if the
initial search would not on its own.354
The mosaic theory has also featured in Dutch law-making, not
in the context of police hacking specifically but for digital criminal
investigations more generally. A committee advising the Dutch
lawmaker on the regulation of digital investigations in the new
Code of Criminal Procedure (envisioned to enter into force around
2024) proposed a general criterion to measure the intrusiveness of
criminal investigation powers. This criterion builds on an existing
Dutch standard of so-called “systematicness,” which involves
the question of whether it is reasonably foreseeable in advance
that “a more or less complete picture of certain aspects of a person’s
private life may arise.”355 If so, particular safeguards apply.
The committee’s advice added a second layer to the standard—
triggering
still
higher
safeguards—of
“far-reaching
systematicness,” which is the case if it is reasonably foreseeable in
advance that “a far-reaching picture of someone’s life can be
created.”356 With its emphasis on the image of someone’s private
life that results from the collection of data, this criterion seems a
direct application of the mosaic theory.
To conclude, content-based frameworks to evaluate the
intrusiveness of police hacking have been used in Italian doctrine
(the framework of informatic privacy) and German case law (an
implicit form of the mosaic theory). Although this seems rather
minimal, it might be useful to focus on the content of computers—
the multitudinous and multifarious data stored and processed in
computers—as a proxy for privacy protection; this approach could
be a fruitful alternative or complementary normative framework to
the container-based approach of protecting computers as the new
bastion of privacy. The content-based approach of protecting

354. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses,
society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”).
355. COMMISSIE MODERNISERING OPSPORINGSONDERZOEK IN HET DIGITALE TIJDPERK,
REGULERING VAN OPSPORINGSBEVOEGDHEDEN IN EEN DIGITALE OMGEVING 37–38 (2018),
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2018/06/
26/rapport-commissie-koops—-regulering-van-opsporingsbevoegdheden-in-een-digitaleomgeving/Rapport+Commissie+Koops+juni+2018.pdf.
356. Id. at 39.
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computers’ contents, combined with a mosaic framework,
resonates with the mosaic theory that emerges more broadly as a
framework to assess the intrusiveness of investigation powers in a
digital context, primarily in the context of police location
tracking,357 but also in the Dutch proposal to formulate more
broadly a general, mosaic-based criterion for assessing the
intrusiveness of digital investigations.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis has highlighted two different approaches to
updating legal frameworks to enable an assessment of the
intrusiveness of investigation powers that is sensitive to the
specifics of an era in which much (if not all) private life resides in
data and mobile computers.
First, a container-based approach uses computers as the
primary proxy of protection, which can be seen as an extension or
analogy of the traditional emphasis in legal systems on protecting
the home as the key container of private life. Particularly, Italian
law and doctrine provide valuable insights into how computer
protection can be conceptualized as a new form of home protection,
in the form of an “informatic home.” Also, German law focuses on
computer protection, not as an extension of home life but as a new,
sui generis object of legal protection. Interestingly, U.S. law, with
its Fourth Amendment doctrine of containers, easily combines
traditional homes and mobile computers as protection-worthy
containers of private life.
Second, a content-based approach uses data as a proxy of
protection, in the form of a general concept of “informatic privacy”
(covering all data in digital environments to which individuals
have, or should have, some form of control in terms of its
accessibility or use) or in the form of the mosaic theory that applies
the concept of a mosaic picture constituted by the set of data that
the police are collecting.
Both approaches apply proxies: they protect computers or data
as such, without specifically requiring that a privacy interest is at
issue. The law can hardly avoid using proxies, since legal protection
focusing on the underlying interests as such will often be too vague
to be workable in practice. Investigation officers need some
357. See Koops, Newell & Škorvánek, supra note 12, at Section IV(B)(3)(b).
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guidance about what they can do to collect data, without having to
make abstract normative evaluations all the time. The core
challenge for legal systems is to apply proxies that are sufficiently
workable in practice (hence, concrete enough for investigation
officers to work with) as well as sufficiently fine-tuned to the
protected interest (hence, containing sufficient normative thrust as
to guide the legal interpretation towards the intended type and
level of protection).
Using computers as a proxy for protection is attractive because
it is easy to apply: investigating officers can easily recognize
computers or smartphones as protected objects, and hence request
the required authorization before starting to investigate them.
However, the container-based approach is crude because it treats
all computing devices alike, whereas the privacy interest can
diverge significantly depending on the type of computer and the
way it is used. Many laptops, desktops, and cell-phones will
contain “the privacies of life,”358 but some laptops and cell-phones
will contain only relatively few or non-privacy-sensitive data (e.g.,
a cell-phone bought and used only to communicate for some
particular drug transactions, or a cell-phone used purely for work
purposes). The container-based approach is also limited in guiding
the investigation within the container: it is useful to determine the
conditions for accessing containers, but not to distinguish between
levels of intrusion of the investigation of their contents.
Here, the content-based approach appears as another approach
with roughly mirroring advantages and drawbacks. The contentbased approach offers a more nuanced guidance of the
investigation of computer data, since it focuses on the types of data
that are actually (intended to be) investigated and the intrusiveness
of that data set. The downside of the content-based approach is that
it is more abstract than the container-based approach, and thus less
workable in practice. How is an investigation officer to determine
when a “mosaic picture” arises that triggers specific levels of
protection? This can be determined by additional proxies, such as
the number and type of data, the way they are combined, and the
data’s impact on someone’s private life, but such a list of factors still
requires a fairly complex assessment that is difficult to perform for
street-level police officers.
358. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
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Since both approaches have valuable benefits but also
drawbacks, we think that both frames emerging from our
analysis—inviolability
of
computers
and
informatic
privacy/mosaic theory—should not be seen as alternatives but as
complementary frameworks. A combination of both might work
best to offset the drawbacks of each new framework and to
capitalize on their combined advantages over traditional
frameworks that no longer work well to assess the intrusiveness of
police hacking.
Some combination of the two frames can be seen in German and
U.K. law. The German approach is to primarily adopt the containerbased protection of computers but then qualify this protection by
limiting it to computers that process data in such a way that mosaic
pictures of individuals’ private lives are likely to arise from the
investigation of their contents.359 In the United Kingdom, the
relevant legislation establishes a framework for issuing warrants
for equipment interference but limits this by a proportionality
condition that requires consideration of the nature of the material
sought and the proposed means of obtaining it. Interestingly, the
combination seems flipped around in Italian doctrine, where
scholars emphasize that primarily the contents of computers are
protection-worthy, while recognizing that such protection is
needed to supplement the dominant spatial approach of protecting
traditional and “informatic” homes. In their view, protecting
“informatic privacy” is necessary because computers are more than
just “informatic homes.”360 “Informatic privacy,” however, remains
a very general, and therewith abstract, normative frame, which
lacks the attractive concreteness of designating certain data-carriers
as containers worthy of protection in themselves.
We conclude that the container-based approach and the
contents-based approach can best be seen as two sides of a coin.
They complement each other in their capacity to serve as a
yardstick to assess the intrusiveness of police hacking (and,
perhaps, of criminal investigation powers in digital contexts more
generally). Choosing one or the other seems unwise: designating
computers as protection-worthy in themselves (“my computer is
my castle”) is attractive but crude; focusing on informatic privacy

359. See supra Sections V(B)(1)–(2).
360. See supra Section V(B)(2).
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and/or the mosaic theory makes normative sense but lacks
practical foothold. We think that a combination of both is likely to
be the most suitable new framework for evaluating the
intrusiveness of police hacking. German law goes a long way in this
direction, but probably still puts too much emphasis on the
container-based approach. Limiting the investigation of computers
that process many and diverse personal data and safeguarding the
core area of private life are helpful to fine-tune the protection of
what is really protection-worthy. However, the framework lacks
guidance to assess the intrusiveness of the investigation once
conditions are fulfilled to enter a protected computer and to guide
the investigation of the contents. With some supplementary
protection derived from the contents-based approach, we think the
German framework could serve as a useful model for other
countries to apply as a normative frame when regulating police
hacking.
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